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NOTES

Not As Bad As We Thought

THE LEGACY OF GEIER V. AMERICAN HONDA
MOTOR COMPANY IN PRODUCT LIABILITY
PREEMPTION
*

I.

INTRODUCTION
[I]n federal preemption, the court decides as a matter of federal law
that the relevant federal statute or regulation reflects, expressly or
impliedly, the intent of Congress to displace state law, including
state tort law, with the federal statute or regulation. The question of
preemption is thus a question of federal law, and a determination
that there is preemption nullifies otherwise operational state law.1

This statement cuts to the heart of why preemption2 is
such a powerful, confusing and controversial area of federal
law. By declaring that federal law preempts state actions3 in a
*

© 2005 Mason A. Barney. All Rights Reserved.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 4, cmt. e (1998).
2
There is a difference of opinion on how to spell “preemption.” The modern
Supreme Court appears to prefer the “pre-emption” spelling. E.g., Geier v. Am. Honda
Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867 (2000); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287
(1995); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); Jones v. Rath Packing, Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1976). In contrast, most scholars on the topic appear to prefer the
“preemption” spelling. E.g., Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of
Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967 (2002); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225
(2000); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767
(1994). Since it is a scholarly work, this Note shall use the “preemption” spelling.
3
The term “state action[s]” as used in this note refers to both state
legislatures creation of legislation and state judicial consideration of tort cases based
on either state common law or state legislation.
1
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given field, a judge permanently displaces all state claims
within the scope of the federal law.4 This is the powerful aspect
of preemption.5 However, because preemption rests upon the
intent of Congress, a difficult concept to pin down under the
best of circumstances, it remains (and probably will always be)
a confusing and sometimes unpredictable area of federal law.6
This Note will examine the impact one case, Geier v.
American Honda Motors Company,7 has had on the preemption
doctrine as it applies to all product liability cases. In Geier, the
Supreme Court considered the question of whether the federal
regulation8 concerning the need for passive restraint
technology9 in new cars preempted the plaintiff’s claim of
defective design against Honda for not manufacturing the 1987
Honda Accord with a driver’s side air bag.10 The Court found
Geier’s claim to be preempted because it “would stand as an
obstacle” to the Department of Transportation’s (DOT)
objectives for FMVSS 208.11 A number of authors, including
Justice Stevens for the dissent in Geier, declared that the

4

Several authors have referred to this type of action as “jurispathic,”
because, through federal preemption, a court can “kill” an entire segment of state law.
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983). See also S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic
Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 694 (1991) (noting how a preemption ruling is
almost always “jurispathic” in result).
5
See Hoke supra note 4, at 690-99 (declaring how the power of preemption
rests in its ability to remove topics from the reach of state law).
6
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540 (2001) (stating that the
court has over the years found the Supremacy Clause, a relatively clear and simple
statement, very difficult to interpret consistently).
7
529 U.S. 861 (2000).
8
The regulation in question in Geier was Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard 208. 49 C.F.R. §571.208 (1984) [hereinafter FMVSS 208]. The Geier suit only
dealt with the 1984 version of the FMVSS 208. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 864.
9
Passive restraint technology is an automotive industry term referring to
devices that protect the car’s occupants in the event of a crash without requiring the
occupant to actively engage the technology. Air bags, for example, automatically deploy
in a crash without the driver having to perform any action beyond the normal
operation of the car. On the other hand, regular seatbelts require the passenger to
buckle them in order for them to be effective. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1983) (hereinafter
“State Farm”). See also 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2003) (requiring cars to meet the
requirements using technology “that require no action by vehicle occupants”). In 1987,
when Geier’s Honda was manufactured, the only passive restraint systems that could
satisfy the standard were airbags and automatic seatbelts. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 35
(1983).
10
Geier, 529 U.S. at 864-65 (stating that the plaintiff’s suit arose from
injuries sustained in 1992 when the plaintiff crashed her 1987 Honda Accord, equipped
only with seat belts, into a tree).
11
Id. at 886 (internal quotations omitted).
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decision shifted the balance of the federal and state power,12
further “muddled” the already confusing preemption doctrine13
and limited many individuals’ rights to recover damages.14
In contrast to this position, this Note will argue that
these declarations of doom were premature and exaggerated.
Geier provides an excellent example of the Court’s modern
approach to implied preemption, the case represents a
refinement of the current preemption methodology without
adversely affecting the way lower courts evaluate the federalstate balance.
Section II of this Note examines the history of federal
preemption that shaped the Court’s decision in Geier. Section II
first examines why the framers of the Constitution thought it
necessary to expressly declare federal law’s supremacy over
state law. Next, Section II briefly reviews the important
preemption principles that developed over the last century.
Section III of this Note summarizes the Supreme Court’s
decision in Geier and comments on Justice Breyer’s reasoning.
Section IV reviews the important effects of the Geier decision,
and argues that those effects are logical extensions of the
existing preemption doctrine. Finally, Section V provides
several examples of how lower courts, and subsequently the
Supreme Court, have interpreted and utilized the Geier
decision. This last section includes a detailed look at the
Supreme Court’s decision in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,15
which provides some validation that the lower courts have been
interpreting Geier correctly.

12

See id. at 906-07 (Steven, J., dissenting) (discussing how the majority has
ignored the presumption against preemption, and forced the state plaintiff to show
instead that their action does not interfere with the federal government’s regulation).
13
Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Study in Judicial Sleight of Hand: Did Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co. Eradicate the Presumption Against Preemption?, 17 BYU J.
PUB. L. 1, 3 (2002) (“[t]he Geier Court, . . . further muddl[ed] long standing preemption
doctrine . . . .”); Nelson, supra note 2, at 232 (“Most commentators who write about
preemption agree on at least one thing: Modern preemption jurisprudence is a
muddle.”).
14
Stacey Allen Carroll, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability
Claims: Adding Clarity and Respect for State Sovereignty to the Analysis of Federal
Preemption Defenses, 36 GA. L. REV. 797, 819 (2002) (declaring that among Geier’s
many damaging potential effects, one was that the holding “eviscerated the possibility
of recovery for many injured plaintiffs”).
15
537 U.S. 51 (2002).
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BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF PREEMPTION

Since the founding of this nation the preemption of state
actions has been a hotly debated topic. The Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause declares: “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”16 From this
“relatively clear and simple mandate,”17 grew most of the
complex federal preemption doctrine.18 The doctrine's evolution
began at the inception of the nation and it has continued to be
refined up to the present day.19 The modern doctrine that has
developed out of this evaluation is a complex one, which
attempts to maintain a balance between the federal
government and the states and contains inherent safeguards to
preserve this balance.
A.

The Origins of Federal Supremacy

The modern preemption doctrine, as embodied in the
Supremacy Clause, was originally considered necessary to
remedy one of the major deficiencies of the Articles of
Confederation. Before the Constitution, the Articles of
Confederation declared: “[e]very State shall abide by the
determination of the United States in Congress assembled, on
all questions which by this confederation are submitted to
them.”20 Under this Article, however, the state and federal
16

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540 (2001) (stating that the
court has over the years found the Supremacy Clause, a relatively clear and simple
statement, very difficult to consistently interpret).
18
It is important to note that not all federal preemption occurs strictly under
the Supremacy Clause. For example preemption can also occur under the dormant
commerce clause or the privileges and immunities clause. Additionally, in order for a
federal action to have preemptive effect it must first be a valid exercise of federal
power. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 303 (2001) (summarizing the
various ways Congress can limit state regulatory and taxing power). But see
Gardbaum, supra note 2 (arguing that contrary to the mainstream opinion, supremacy
of federal law and the preemption of state law are in fact two different legal concepts,
and for the sake of clarity of the doctrine should not be viewed as the same). Gardbaum
argues that a supremacy doctrine should be used on a case-by-case basis to determine
which law, state or federal, should apply, whereas a preemption doctrine should be
used when Congress has explicitly stripped a state of jurisdiction in a given area. Id.
19
See Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 785-807 (providing a detailed
“Constitutional History of Preemption”); Davis, supra note 2 at 972-1005 (discussing
th
the history of preemption in the 20 century).
20
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII. See generally Nelson, supra note 2,
at 247 n.66 (providing a history of supremacy in the United States, including
supremacy under the Articles of Confederation).
17
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judicial systems operated completely independent of one
another.21 This separate and equal existence meant that state
judges were not bound to enforce the determinations of
Congress unless the state legislature passed a law
implementing the congressional act.22 This practice allowed
states to sidestep federal legislation they considered to be
against their interests. If an individual state did not agree with
Congress on an issue, the state could simply not enact any
enforcing legislation.23 Consequently, the effectiveness of the
central government under the Articles of Confederation was
severely limited even over those areas where the Articles gave
the central government control.24 Having learned from the
weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation,25 the Constitution’s
framers not only required states to enforce federal law,26 but
made federal law the “highest in authority” in every state.27
21

See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 236 (James Madison) (George W. Carey,
James McClellan ed., 2001) (stating that, during the writing of the Constitution, many
state constitutions did not even recognize the existence of the federal government).
22
Nelson, supra note 2, at 247; THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 71 (Alexander
Hamilton) (George W. Carey, James McClellan ed., 2001) (referring to the
ineffectiveness of laws passed by Congress under the Articles of Confederation,
Hamilton stated: “in practice they are mere recommendations which the States observe
or disregard at their option.”). See also Gerald Gunther, The Supremacy Clause: The
Central Element of the Constitutional Scheme, in OUR PECULIAR SECURITY: THE
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION AND LIMITED GOVERNMENT 133, 136-37 (Eugene W. Hickock
Jr. et al. eds. 1993) (stating that under the Articles of Confederation there was an
“absence of machinery to enforce national measures . . . against individuals”).
23
See Gunther, supra note 22, at 136 (arguing that the idea of supremacy of
the federal government was not a new idea to the Constitution and that the problem
with the supremacy of the Articles of Confederation arose from their implementation
and not their underlying theory). See e.g., Nelson, supra note 2, at 248-250 (discussing
how after the Treaty of Peace which ended the revolutionary war, the states and
Congress disagreed over whether the Treaty automatically became part of every state’s
laws and therefore overrode previous or subsequent state acts that ran counter to it).
24
See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 236 (James Madison) (George W. Carey,
James McClellan ed., 2001) (arguing in favor of the need for the Supremacy Clause by
comparing the powers of Congress under a Constitution without the Supremacy Clause
to “the same impotent condition with [Congress under the Articles of Confederation]”).
25
See id. (giving four reasons why, in comparison to the government under
the Articles of Confederation, the Supremacy Clause was necessary; 1) the federal
Constitution made the state sovereign powers, and therefore as such they could
potentially have annulled any act performed under a power beyond that granted the
Congress under the Articles of Confederation; 2) many of the state constitutions did not
recognize the federal government, and without the Supremacy Clause, in those states,
the power of the federal government could be questioned; 3) since the constitutions of
the states are different, a federal law or treaty might conflict with some and not with
others, thereby making federal law applicable in some states and not in others; and 4)
without the Supremacy Clause, the federal government would be at the mercy of every
state government, creating “a monster, in which the head was under the direction of
the members.”).
26
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall

2/28/2005 2:15:30 PM

954

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:3

Despite this apparent agreement about the necessity of
the Supremacy Clause, even from the early history of the
republic,28 settling on where the federal law ends and state law
begins has always been a contentious issue.29 According to the
Supreme Court, the question of where to draw this line is a
matter of Congressional intent.30 Framing the decision to
preempt in terms of Congressional intent may have made the
preemption doctrine more difficult to implement, but it was the
correct approach.31 It is correct because as shown, the framers
unquestioningly made congressional laws supreme over the

be bound thereby, any Thing in the . . . Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
27
Nelson, supra note 2, at 250-252 (describing why the framers thought it
important to include the Supremacy Clause). Additionally Nelson stated that both
Samuel Johnson in his 1785 dictionary of the English language, and Chief Justice
Marshall in his article in defense of McCulloch v. Maryland, defined supreme to mean
“highest in authority.” Id. at 250.
28
See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 3 (1824) (declaring that
New York’s grant of a monopoly over the water transportation in New York harbor “in
collision with the acts of Congress regulating the coasting trade, which being made in
pursuance of the Constitution, are supreme, and the State laws must yield to that
supremacy. . . .”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819). The
Court stated:
[T]he states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operation of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the power vested in the general
government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the Constitution has declared.
Id. See also HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL 1801–
1835, at 140-47 (1997) (discussing McCulloch’s position as Marshall’s premier opinion
defining the federal-state balance, but acknowledging that even after the opinion, there
was still considerable debate over federal supremacy, to the point that Marshall later
wrote anonymous essays replying to numerous attacks on the very concept of federal
supremacy).
29
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540-41 (2001) (“[The
Supremacy Clause] has generated considerable discussion in cases where we have had
to discern whether Congress has preempted state action in a particular area.”).
30
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990) (“[p]re-emption
fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.”).
31
See Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907-908 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (arguing that placing the power of preemption in Congress’s hands is
correct as an inherent structural safeguard to the preemption principle). Justice
Stevens declared that Congress, as the branch which most represents the interests of
the states, would be the best branch to balance the power between the federal
government and the state. Id. at 908. This is also not just Justice Stevens’ theory. In
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat 48 (codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C), Congress ordered the Congressional Budget Office to
review all legislation coming out of committee for potential unfunded mandates that
the legislation will place on the states, especially areas where the federal law will
preempt state laws. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PREEMPTIONS IN FEDERAL
LEGISLATION IN THE 106TH CONGRESS (JUNE 2001), available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/
28xx/doc2885/Preemptions.pdf.
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states.32 Additionally, as Justice Marshal in McCulloch phrased
it, Congress may choose whatever means it deems “necessary
and proper . . . for carrying its powers into execution.”33
Therefore, the decision of whether it is “necessary and proper”
to preempt state law is a decision Congress must make and
determining its intent is the “ultimate touchstone” of every
preemption analysis.34
Determining whether Congress intended to preempt a
given state action is, however, a difficult proposition.35 It is
impossible for Congress to articulate for every conceivable
situation whether it intended to preempt the state law at
issue.36 Rather, courts are charged with determining on a caseby-case basis whether Congress intended to preempt the
particular state action. Since Congress rarely speaks with one
voice in giving its reasons for enacting a law, the Supreme
Court has stated that, as an initial matter, “evidence of
preemptive purpose [should be] sought in the text and
structure of the statute at issue.”37
However, a statute’s text often does not clearly evince
Congress’s intent.38 In these instances, courts must often resort
32

Yet, the federal government is inherently a government of limited power,
and its laws are superior to state laws only when it acts within one of its enumerated
powers. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 304.
33
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 324. See also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc, 505
U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (declaring that since McCulloch, it has been clear that any “state
law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect.’”); THE FEDERALIST No. 33 at 158161 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey, James McClellan ed., 2001) (arguing that
the Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause are merely truisms which
cannot exist without each other).
34
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S.
497, 504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))).
35
Hines v. Davidowitz 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (“There is not—and from the
very nature of the problem there cannot be—any rigid formula or rule which can be
used as a universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of
Congress.”).
36
See Malone, 435 U.S. at 504 (stating that Congress rarely indicates its
preemptive intent clearly). When courts talk about preempting state law, they
sometimes will also include state common law. Compare Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521
(discussing how the phrase chosen by Congress to discuss the state laws it intended to
preempt was broad and included state common law as well as positive state
enactments) with Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 (declaring that the express preemption clause
in the Federal Motor Vehicles Safety Act does not automatically preempt state common
law because of the saving clause).
37
CXS Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (evaluating the reach
of the express preemption clause in the Federal Railroad Safety Act, Justice White first
analyzed the words in the clause to see if the words provided any guidance as to
Congress’s preemptive intent).
38
See Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202-05
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the difficulty of discerning Congress’s preemptive intent
when the Consumer Product Safety Act contains both an express preemption clause,
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to using circumstantial evidence, like the history surrounding
the law or regulation,39 or an implementing agency's post hoc
opinion of the act,40 to determine whether Congress intended to
preempt the state action.41 One illustration of how problematic
this determination can be is the fact that the Supreme Court
has attempted to tackle preemption questions no fewer than
300 times in the past fifty years.42 Simply by virtue of this
volume of decisions, it is easy to understand why the resulting
doctrine is quite convoluted.43
B.

How Congress Can Preempt State Actions

The complexity of the preemption problem has created a
doctrine where by Congress is said to have preempted state
actions in a variety of different situations. Beginning in the
th
early part of the 20 century,44 the Court recognized that a
state action could be preempted in two ways—either expressly
or impliedly.45 Express preemption occurs when Congress
and a saving clause that states that compliance with the Act does not exempt an
individual from common law liability).
39
Geier was by no means the first case where the Supreme Court used
resources beyond the text of the statute to interpret Congress’s intent. In what
Professor Gardbaum believed was the genesis of modern implied preemption theory,
Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 807, the Court in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218
(1947), relied heavily on statutory history in holding that the Warehouse Act implicitly
preempted state regulatory actions regarding Warehouse rates. Id. at 232.
40
See e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 875-85 (2000) (using
the Department of Transportation’s evaluation of the preemptive effects of the
regulation in making the Court’s final determination); Hillsborough County, Fla. v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985) (evaluating an action challenging the
constitutionality of local ordinances governing blood donation, the Court placed a good
deal of emphasis on the Food and Drug Administration’s intention not to preempt state
actions).
41
See S. Doc. No. 103-6, at 917-19 (1992) (Supp. S. Doc. No. 106-27 (2000)) at
918 (describing for U.S. Senators the role of the courts and the methods the courts
employ when deciding a preemption case), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
constitution/pdf/con009.pdf.
42
Davis, supra note 2, at 969 n.9 (describing how there had been
approximately 150 Supreme Court decisions concerning preemption between 1940 and
1980, and then approximately another 150 decisions on the subject between 1980 and
2000).
43
See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (stating that it is
impossible to formulate a simple “yardstick” or “infallible” test; preemption inherently
requires a complex analysis without a “clear distinctly marked formula”).
44
Professor Davis has argued that much of modern preemption doctrine was
developed as a response to the expansion of congressional power during the New Deal.
Davis, supra note 2, at 978.
45
See Jones v. Savage, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) (“For when the question is
whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the statute must, of
course, be considered, and that which needs must be implied is of no less force than
that which is expressed.”).
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declares within a statute its intention to preempt state laws
governing the same issue as the federal law.46 Conversely,
implied preemption occurs when an act’s “structure and
purpose”47 suggest that Congress intended federal law to
supersede state actions governing the same field or issue.48
The Supreme Court has accepted two different
categories of implied preemption. One category of preemption,
called “field preemption,” is found where Congress legislates a
field so completely that it is clear Congress intended the
federal government to have exclusive jurisdiction in that field.49
The second category of implied preemption is broadly referred
to as “implied conflict preemption,” or just “conflict
preemption.”50 Conflict preemption can be found in two different
situations. One instance of conflict preemption is when the
state action is incompatible with the congressional law, such as
when it is physically impossible for an individual to
simultaneously comply with both the federal law and the state
law.51 This is often referred to as “physical impossibility”
conflict preemption.52 The other situation where conflict
preemption occurs is where the state action will stand as an
46

English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (“[W]hen Congress has
made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the court’s task is an easy
one.”). E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc, 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that the
section of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 which stated “no statement
relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 4 of this
act, shall be required on any cigarette package” expressly showed Congress’s intent to
preempt all state laws relating to the labeling of cigarette packages).
47
Jones v. Rath Packing 430 U.S. 519, 529 (1976) (“[State law is preempted]
whether Congress’s command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose.”).
48
E.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001)
(dismissing plaintiff’s state law “fraud on the FDA” claim, because such a claim would
stand as an obstacle to the flexibility built into the Food and Drug Administration’s
regulatory process, and therefore was implicitly preempted by the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act).
49
E.g., Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926) (affirming the
judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that in delegating authority to the
Interstate Commerce Commission over “the design, construction and material of every
part of the locomotive,” Congress had occupied the field of locomotive safety and had
excluded all state actions on the topic); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947) (“The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”).
50
See Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (declaring that since the
New York grant and the Federal license conflict, the New York grant can not be
allowed to stand).
51
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143
(1963) (“A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable, and requires no
inquiry into congressional design, where compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .”).
52
Carroll, supra note 14, at 821.
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obstacle to the federal law’s objectives.53 Commentators often
refer to this latter form of conflict preemption as “obstacle
preemption” or “frustration of purpose preemption.”54
The Supreme Court in Geier ultimately rested their
decision on an obstacle preemption theory.55 The Court’s
majority based this conclusion on the idea that the plaintiff’s
tort claim would frustrate the Department of Transportation’s
objectives for FMVSS 208.56 Despite the Court’s recent reliance
on obstacle preemption in Geier, this type of preemption has
long been the most contentious.57 Most commentators have been
concerned about the expansion of obstacle preemption due to
its inherent ability for courts to manipulate a perceived
congressional objective.58 This issue of what were Congress’s
objectives was, in fact, the major disagreement between the
majority and dissent in Geier. Justice Breyer, writing for the
majority, declared the objective of FMVSS 208 to be the
“gradual phase-in of passive restraints.”59 Conversely, Justice
Stevens, writing for the dissent, stated the objective to be the
53

Hines v. Davidowitz 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (“Our primary function is to
determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, [the state law]
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”). E.g., Carrasquilla v. Mazda Motor Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 169
(M.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that a “shoulder-only” automatic seat belt defective design
claim would stand as an obstacle to FMVSS 208’s objective of offering manufacturers a
choice of restraint technologies). See also Nelson, supra note 2, at 265-70 (discussing
how the Supreme Court in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 650 (1971), traced the
origins of obstacle preemption back to a quote from Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in
Gibbons v. Ogden, “‘acts of the State Legislatures . . . [which] interfere with, or are
contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution,’ are invalid
under the Supremacy Clause”).
54
Stephen R. Bough & Lynn R. Johnson, Crossing the Center Line:
Preemption in Automobile Product Liability Cases, 57 J. MO. B. 30, 31 (2001) (“Obstacle
or frustration of purpose preemption is quite common, and is found where state laws
frustrate the purpose behind the federal statutes regulating the same subject matter.”).
55
Geier, 529 U.S. at 881 (holding that the plaintiff’s tort action creating a
duty to install airbags on all 1987 cars would present an obstacle to the mix of passive
restraint devices sought by the federal regulation).
56
See discussion infra Part II.B.
57
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 331 U.S. 218, 231 (1947) (Referring to obstacle
preemption, the court stated, “[i]t is often a perplexing question whether Congress has
precluded state action or by the choice of selective regulatory measures has left the
police power of the state undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations
collide”).
58
The Supreme Court 1999 Term—Leading Cases, (pt. III A) 114 HARV. L.
REV. 339, 345-46 (2000) [hereinafter Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases] (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67) (“Because obstacle preemption relies by definition
on the ‘full purposes and objectives of Congress,’ its boundaries are somewhat
indeterminate.”). See Davis, supra note 2, at 1021 (discussing how obstacle preemption
eradicated the presumption against preemption and ultimately leads to a presumption
in favor of preemption).
59
Geier, 529 U.S. at 879.
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general reduction in automotive related injuries.60 The
majority’s narrowly defined objective resulted in more state
actions conflicting with it, whereas the dissent’s more broadly
defined objective was harmonious with more state actions,
thereby preserving those actions.61 Despite all this, however, it
is important to remember that the category distinctions for
preemption (express preemption, physical impossibility
preemption, field preemption, and obstacle preemption) are by
no means rigid, and the lines between them are often unclear.62
C.

The Presumption Against Preemption

The presumption against preemption is an additional
rule of interpretation that the Supreme Court and
commentators have often cited as a limitation to federal
preemption.63 In an oft-cited passage,64 the Supreme Court in
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.65 explained that an analysis of a
60

Id. at 889 (Stevens, J. dissenting). This disagreement was due in large
measure to the fact that Justice Stevens was taking as the congressional objective only
the objective stated in the Safety Act. Id. Justice Breyer however chose to say that the
congressional objective was in fact the DOT’s objective since the DOT was the rule
making body as concerns FMVSS 208. Id. at 874-75 (Breyer, J. majority).
61
Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 58, at 345 (pointing out
that the majority’s narrower objective had a broader “preemptive scope” than the
dissent’s looser objective).
62
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990) (discussing how this
framework is not “rigidly distinct,” but that since it had been previously recognized
that the court believed it appropriate to invoke it generally). An excellent example of
the vagueness of this line comes from Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. at 518.
As Justice Thomas later explained it in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, the Court in
Cipollone first stated that it must analyze the case using only the express preemption
clause in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, but then two paragraphs
later engaged in a clear conflict preemption analysis. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick 514
U.S. 208, 288-289 (1995) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518
(1992)).
63
See English, 496 U.S. at 79 (stating that the court has been hesitant to find
field preemption in areas governed by the presumption against preemption);
Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715-716 (1985)
(describing how the presumption against preemption made the court less inclined to
find the local ordinance implicitly preempted, because an ordinance regulating the
safety of blood plasma dealt with the health of the state’s citizens, a field traditionally
occupied by the state).
64
According to the Westlaw Online Custom Digest for the presumption
KeyCite (KeyCite 360k18.3), Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) had
been cited 781 times as of Feb. 2, 2005. This makes Rice the most frequently cited case
for this proposition. See also Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 807 (stating that the Rice
decision was the “locus classicus” of the modern preemption doctrine, and that it is the
most cited statement of the presumption against preemption).
65
331 U.S. 218 (1947) (deciding, in light of the state’s long standing interest
in internal state commerce, if the Illinois Commerce Commission had been preempted
from adjudicating complaints concerning unjust and excessive rates for the storage of
grain).

2/28/2005 2:15:30 PM

960

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:3

preemption issue begins “with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the state were not to be superseded by the
federal act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”66 While the presumption has had a limited effect in
the area of express preemption,67 its effects have been far
greater in the area of implied preemption.68 According to the
Court, the presumption against preemption is a counterweight
against the judiciary’s tendency towards giving an expansive
interpretation to ambiguous congressional intent.69 As Justice
Thurgood Marshall explained, the real purpose behind the
presumption is to ensure that the carefully established balance
between the federal government and the states is not
“disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the
courts.”70
While serving an important role in preserving the
federal-state balance, the presumption against preemption is
nevertheless only a tool of interpretation.71 Rather than stifling
66

Id. at 230. While not an issue in Geier, it is important to note that a
threshold inquiry to the presumption is its applicability only in areas of historic state
control. In areas that have traditionally been regulated by the federal government, like
the nuclear power industry, the presumption against preemption does not apply. E.g.,
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248-249 (1984) (discussing the federal
government’s long standing occupation of all regulations relating to the field of nuclear
power). Additionally, the court in Rice also stated that the “clear and manifest purpose
of Congress” could be established through either express or implied preemption
theories. 331 U.S. at 230.
67
See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518 (Stevens plurality opinion) (Discussing an
express preemption clause, the plurality declared “we must construe these provisions
in light of the presumption against the preemption of state police power relations. This
presumption reinforces the appropriateness of a narrow reading of [the express
preemption clause].”) (emphasis added). But see Nelson, supra note 2, at 293-94
(questioning the appropriateness of the application of the presumption against
preemption to express preemption clauses, especially since Congress, in theory, has
already taken into account state interests when it wrote the law, and therefore
asserting that there is no need, as a rule of statutory interpretation, to give those same
interests a preferable standing).
68
See Nelson, supra note 2, at 293 (stating that that the courts have always
required “persuasive reasons” when declaring a state law to be preempted by
implication of federal law); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142 (1964) (“[F]ederal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed
preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons.”).
69
Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he presumption serves as a limiting principle that prevents federal
judges from running amok with our potentially boundless . . . doctrine of implied
conflict preemption . . . .”).
70
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); See United States v.
Bass 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (“[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will
not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance.”).
71
See Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 805-07 (describing the history behind the
presumption, and clearly stating that it was a creation of the court to help it in
divining Congress’s intent in implied preemption situations).
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in any way Congress’s ability to preempt state law, the
presumption is intended merely to aid the judiciary in
discerning Congressional intent—the “ultimate touchstone” of
every preemption case.72 In recent years, many commentators
have noted that the presumption has somewhat fallen into
disfavor with the Court.73 However, as a tool of interpretation
the presumption has been re-interpreted and applied in diverse
ways by the Court over time.74 While it is true that, in recent
years, the Supreme Court appears to have invoked the
presumption by name less frequently,75 it is a mistake to
conclude that the Court therefore ignored the presumption
entirely in implied preemption cases.76 Rather, it is more
accurate to say that the Court simply has found reasons to say
that the given legislation or regulation overcame the
presumption against preemption.77
III.

GEIER V. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY

In 1992, Alexis Geier hit a tree while driving her 1987
Honda Accord.78 At the time, she was wearing a manual
shoulder and lap seat belt—the only passive restraint
technology the car possessed.79 The car was not equipped with a
driver’s side air bag.80 After the accident, Ms. Geier and her
72

Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
See, e.g., Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 58, at 339-40;
Raeker-Jordan, supra note 13, at 1-3.
74
See generally Davis, supra note 2, at 972-97 (providing a detailed history of
the evolution of the preemption doctrine and specifically the presumption against
preemption).
75
See id. at 990-97 (detailing the use of the presumption against preemption
in the 1980’s and 1990’s).
76
Contra Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 906-907 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority ignored the presumption and “put
the burden on petitioners to show that their tort claim would not frustrate the
Secretary’s purposes”); Raeker-Jordan, supra note 13, at 43-44 (declaring that the
Geier court departed from its established preemption doctrine and ignored the
presumption against preemption).
77
See discussion infra Part III.B. See also Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign
immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV 1, 40 (1999) (“[O]ne critical
characteristic of the presumption against preemption is that it can be overcome by an
adequate showing of Congressional intent . . . .”). Professor Young notes that there are
very few meaningful limits that can be placed on the preemption doctrine while
remaining true to the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 40 n.181. As a result, he suggests that
the Court’s reluctance in recent years to interpret preemption too narrowly stems from
the Court’s inherently limited political capital and its desire not to enter into direct
conflict with Congress over the issue. Id. at 38.
78
Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
79
Id.
80
Id.
73
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parents filed a common law claim in the District of Columbia
against American Honda Motor Company Inc. (Honda),
alleging that Ms. Geier’s Accord had been negligently and
defectively designed because it lacked a driver’s side air bag.81
Honda, however, responded by arguing that the 1984 version82
of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (FMVSS 208),
promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act), 83 both expressly and impliedly
preempted any state action against Honda for not installing a
passive restraint system.84
A.

The Express Preemption and Saving Clauses

Justice Breyer, writing for a five-member majority,85
started his analysis by examining whether the Safety Act’s
express preemption clause affected Ms. Geier’s action.86
Contrary to the approach advocated by Honda,87 Justice Breyer
did not solely look to the text of the Act’s express preemption
clause,88 stating instead that the express preemption provision
81

Id.
Geier’s Honda had been manufactured in 1987 under the 1984 version of
FMVSS 208. Id. at 864. As a result, the Court only examined the 1984 version of
FMVSS 208. Id. at 864-65.
83
Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13811431 (1988)).
84
Brief for Respondent at 9, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861
(2000) (No. 98-1811). In its brief Honda clearly stated that it was worried about
“massive, repeated, tort liability for having installed seat belts, and not airbags.” Id. at
7. With that as its primary concern, Honda’s position was that the express preemption
clause of the Safety Act preempted any attempt by the state to establish any safety
standard, which Honda argued included the creation of a standard through tort
actions. Id. Honda contended that the saving clause did not preserve any liability, but
instead simply precluded a defendant from asserting a defense of compliance with a
federal standard. Id. at 7-8. While the Court did eventually find that the plaintiff’s
claims were preempted, it rejected most of Honda’s reasoning for doing so. Geier, 529
U.S. at 867-68.
85
The five member majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Associate Justices Breyer, O’Conner, Scalia, and Kennedy. Geier, 529 U.S. at 863.
86
Id. at 867.
87
Brief for Respondent at 10-14, Geier (advocating that the plain language of
the express preemption clause showed that it was meant to encompass common law
actions).
88
The Safety Act’s express preemption clause read:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this
subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have
any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any
motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment
which is not identical to the Federal standard.
Geier, 529 U.S. at 867 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (repealed 1994)) (internal
quotations omitted).
82
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must be interpreted along with the Safety Act’s “saving
clause.”89 The saving clause stated, “‘[c]ompliance with’ a
federal safety standard ‘does not exempt any person from any
liability under common law.’”90
In holding that “[t]he saving clause assumes that there
are some significant number of common-law liability cases to
save,”91 Justice Breyer argued that if the express preemption
clause applied to common law actions, then there would be
little, if any, common law liability remaining.92 Yet if Congress
had intended little or no liability to remain, Justice Breyer
questioned why the Act would include a saving clause, which
had no meaning other than to exclude a type of defense to a
common law tort claim.93 Consequently, he held that a broad
reading of the express preemption clause could not be correct.
In order to harmonize the two clauses,94 Justice Breyer declared
that, read in the “presence of the saving clause,” the express
preemption clause inherently preempted positive state actions,

89

Geier, 529 U.S. at 868. Justice Breyer did concede that a broad reading of
the express preemption clause, without the saving clause, would probably preempt
common law tort actions as well as positive state legislative enactments. Id. However,
he points out that such a reading would eliminate all potential liability at common law,
and he said there was no convincing evidence that Congress sought to do this. Id.
90
Id. The full text of the saving clause reads: “[C]ompliance with any Federal
motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any
person from any liability under common law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (repealed 1994).
Justice Breyer chose to refer to this clause as the “saving clause” because, in his
analysis, it preserved, or saved, the common law from being totally preempted by the
express preemption clause. The term “savings clause” was the term favored in the brief
by the Solicitor General when referring to §1397(k). Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 8, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861 (2000) (No. 98-1811). To the contrary, Geier, who was advocating that the saving
clause preserved all tort actions, preferred the term “anti-preemption provision” to
refer to § 1397(k). Brief for Petitioner at 14, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861 (2000) (No. 98-1811).
91
Geier, 529 U.S. at 868. This statement is probably the single most
fundamental building block upon which the Court’s interpretation of the express and
saving clauses rests.
92
Id.
93
Id. This holding can be understood as a response to the position held by
Honda and several lower courts that the saving clause merely prohibited a defendant
from defending an action by asserting compliance with a federal standard. See Brief for
Respondent at 21-26, Geier; Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 729 N.E.2d 45, 49-50 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000), aff’d, 757 N.E.2d 75 (Ill. 2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) (holding, before
Geier was decided, that the Federal Boating Act’s saving clause, which was worded
very similarly to the Safety Act’s saving clause, was merely meant to preclude a
defense of compliance).
94
Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 58, at 340-41
(characterizing Justice Breyer’s decision as harmonizing the preemption and saving
clauses).
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such as a legislative enactment, but did not necessarily
preempt state common law tort actions.95
Having determined that the saving clause preserved
some common law actions, Justice Breyer next examined
whether the clause went further, preserving absolutely all tort
actions from ever being preempted under the Safety Act.96 He
concluded, “that the savings clause . . . does not bar the
ordinary working of conflict preemption principles.”97 Justice
Breyer reasoned that Congress would not enact legislation that
required
“compliance-with-federal-regulation”
as
a
precondition, and then allow states to carve away the
regulation through common law actions that conflicted with it.98
It was more likely, in his opinion, that the saving clause was
designed as a buffer to the express preemption clause to allow
for some common law liability while still preserving implied
preemption principles to protect the overall objectives of the
regulation.99 Justice Breyer stated that, in the past, the Court
had refused to read a saving clause broadly when such a
95

Geier, 529 U.S. at 868. See also Rogers v. Cosco 737 N.E.2d 1158 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000) (interpreting the Safety Act’s having both a preemption and a saving clause
as a “congressional compromise” between a national interest in uniformity and a local
interest in compensating accident victims based upon common law tort standards).
According to the Indiana Court of Appeals in Rogers, the dichotomy between legislative
actions versus common law actions should not be taken too literally. Id. at 1164-1165.
There the defendants argued that the saving clause was inapplicable because the
Indiana state legislature had included product liability common law negligence actions
within the framework of its product liability statute. Id. at 1164. The Court of Appeals
however said that this distinction was without merit because the underlying purpose
behind the express preemption clause was to bar state courts from enacting motor
vehicle safety regulations that were different from the national standard. Id. at 1165.
The appellate court held that it was not Congress’s intent to render inapplicable a
state’s general common law standards simply because the state chose to codify those
standards. Id.
96
Geier, 529 U.S. at 869. The petitioner (Geier) advocated in her brief that
the Safety Act’s saving clause exempted all common law actions from the effects of the
express preemption clause. Brief for Petitioner at 35-41, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
519 U.S. 861 (2000) (No. 98-1811). Then she took this argument a step further. Ms.
Geier asserted that, according to Supreme Court precedent, the inclusion of an express
preemption clause did not specifically preclude common law actions from being
impliedly preempted. Id.
97
Geier, 529 U.S. at 869. (emphasis added).
98
Id. at 869-70. This reading complied with Justice Scalia’s comments in
Cipollone, where he expressed concern over what he perceived as the Court’s
declaration that when express preemption exists, implied preemption cannot also exist.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 547-548 (1992) (Scalia, J. concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In this comment he stated that it would
be inconsistent with precedent to hold that a state “could impose requirements entirely
contrary to federal law” so long as they were outside the prescribed scope express
preemption clause. Id. at 547.
99
Geier, 529 U.S. at 870.
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reading would unbalance an established federal regulatory
scheme.100 This determination, that in statutes containing both
an express preemption clause and a saving clause, the
“ordinary workings of [implied] preemption” still apply,101 has
proven to be one of Geier’s most important contributions to the
preemption doctrine.102
B.

Did Geier’s Action Conflict with FMVSS 208?

Applying this analysis to the facts at hand, the Court
identified the major question posed as whether a common law
“no airbag” action would conflict with FMVSS 208.103 Since
FMVSS 208 was a regulation promulgated under a
congressional act, the regulation’s preemptive reach became a
question of departmental intent.104 To determine whether the
Department of Transportation (DOT) intended to preempt state
law, Justice Breyer looked to the history of the regulation, the
DOT’s comments at the time of FMVSS 208’s promulgation,
and the department’s current stance on the issue.105 The
regulation’s history, as presented in the Court’s opinion,
showed how the DOT had struggled since 1970 to implement a
passive restraint requirement that would be economical for the
manufacturers to implement and which the public would
embrace.106 The Department’s contemporaneous explanation of
the regulation made clear that there were seven “significant
considerations” that were taken into account when creating the

100

Id. (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106-07 (2000)).
Id. at 869. This was the interpretation advocated by the Solicitor General
in his brief Amicus Curiae and on behalf of the DOT. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 8-9, Geier. He argued, when Congress
legislates it always does so “against the background of the Supremacy Clause.” Id. at
17. Implicit in this background is the understanding that the federal law will always
prevail when there is a conflict between state and federal law. Id. As a result, unless
Congress expressly excludes it from implied preemption, common law claims preserved
by a saving clause, must still be subject to the limitations of implied preemption. Id.
17-18. If common law actions were allowed to operate outside of implied preemption
principles, the Solicitor General reasoned that the actions could then undermine the
congressional objectives for a given regulation. Id.
102
See discussion infra Part V.A.
103
Geier, 529 U.S. at 874.
104
In this situation Justice Breyer stated that “[t]he agency is likely to have a
thorough understanding of its own regulations and its objective and is ‘uniquely
qualified’ to comprehend the likely impact of state requirements.” Id. at 883. Therefore,
he declared that the Agency’s own views should make a difference in the interpretation
of its own regulation. Id.
105
Id. at 874-75, 881.
106
Id. at 875-77.
101
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regulation.107 The DOT made clear that seatbelts were a critical
part of overall passenger safety.108 In 1984, less than 20% of
front seat passengers used manual seatbelts.109 Airbags and
other passive restraint systems could bridge the safety gap
created by the lack of individuals using seat belts.110 Yet the
DOT also had to take into account the fact that passive
restraint systems had their own problems.111 Non-detachable
automatic safety belts had their own shortcomings and were
disliked by the public.112 Moreover, airbags could be hazardous,
and were significantly more expensive to install and maintain
than automatic safety belts.113
The DOT believed that FMVSS 208 had two important
components that would balance these varying and somewhat
conflicting considerations.114 The DOT allowed manufacturers to
choose between several different passive restraint systems.115
By not mandating a single type of passive restraint system, it
was thought that manufactures would have more of an
incentive to explore alternative passive restraint systems in
the hopes that they could improve the automobile's safety and
reduce the passive restraint system’s cost.116 In addition to
offering a choice, FMVSS 208 also allowed the passive restraint
systems to be phased in gradually between 1986 and 1989.117
The reason for this was that manufacturers needed time to
develop improved airbags and alternative passive restraint
systems.118 The phase-in program was also designed to increase
public awareness and acceptance of passive restraint systems.119
To encourage the manufacturers to have a mix of systems that
would include air bags, FMVSS 208 allowed manufacturers to
count each vehicle designed with an airbag as 1.5 vehicles for
purposes of achieving the percentages required by the

107

Id. at 877-78.
Geier, 529 U.S. at 877-78.
Id.
110
Id. at 877.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Geier, 529 U.S. at 878.
114
See id. at 878-79.
115
Id. at 878.
116
Id. at 879. The Department specifically rejected an “all airbag” standard
out of safety concerns and a desire to gather more data about the effectiveness of
alternative passive restraint systems. Id. at 879.
117
Id.
118
Geier, 529 U.S. at 879.
119
Id. at 879.
108
109
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regulation.120 Through the Solicitor General, the DOT informed
the Court that FMVSS 208 “‘embodies the Secretary’s policy
judgment that safety would best be promoted if manufacturers
installed alternative protection systems in their fleets rather
than one particular system in every car.’”121
Considering FMVSS 208’s long and complex history,
Justice Breyer stated that the DOT’s opinion that Ms. Geier’s
action “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment [of the
Department’s objectives],”122 must hold “some weight.”123 He
declared that since Congress had delegated the regulatory
authority to the Department, and because the subject was a
technical one which required a great deal of familiarity with
the automobile industry, the DOT was “uniquely qualified” to
determine the impact of a state requirement.124 Justice Breyer
explained that the factors that DOT weighed when
promulgating FMVSS 208 were identified over many years of
experience forming policy around passenger safety.125 It is
unlikely that a jury or a judge, in a common law situation,
could have adequately assimilated the technical complexities
and the public acceptance factors in forming a common law
judgment that would have satisfied the six factors mentioned
by the Court.
An intrinsic part of Geier's claim was that Honda had
breached its duty to design a safe car by not installing an
airbag in her Accord.126 Justice Breyer stated that if Geier were
to win her case, then all new cars sold in 1987 in the District of
Columbia would have been required to have an air bag.127
Justice Breyer declared that such a ruling would have
prevented the “gradual passive restraint phase-in the federal
regulation deliberately imposed,” and thus stood as “an
obstacle to the variety and mix of devices” Congress had
intended.128 For that reason, Justice Breyer held that Geier’s
120

Id. at 879-80. In previous iterations of FMVSS 208, the DOT had found it
difficult to get manufacturers to voluntarily install air bags because of the cost of air
bags was significantly higher than that of automatic seat belts. Id. at 878-879. The air
bag cost was one of the considerations behind the gradual phase-in program. Id. at 87980.
121
Id. at 881 (emphasis in original).
122
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 2526, Geier.
123
Geier, 508 U.S. at 883.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 877-78.
126
Id. at 865, 881.
127
Id. at 881.
128
Geier, 508 U.S. at 881.
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state action must be preempted in order to allow the federal
regulation to achieve the purpose for which it was enacted.129
IV.

GEIER’S LEGACY

At the time, Geier embodied the result of more than a
decade’s worth of case law concerning the preemption of
common law product liability actions. The Geier holding
combined the analysis of several leading cases into a single
approach to examining preemption questions. The holding
clarified the important question of how express preemption and
saving clauses are to be interpreted together and provided a
limited solution under which the needs of both the federal
government and the states were met.130 Furthermore, contrary
to the opinion of several commentators,131 the Geier decision did
take into account the presumption against preemption. Lastly,
the holding made clear the importance of agency opinions in
determining the preemptive reach of complex federal
regulations.
A.

The Express Preemption Clause and the Saving Clause

Among its other distinctions, the Geier decision will
probably be most remembered for its reading of the express
preemption clause in conjunction with the saving clause.132
Specifically, the majority held that state actions can be
preempted under “ordinary preemption principles” even where
a Congressional act contains both an express preemption and a
savings clause. 133
129

Id. at 881-82. Justice Breyer continued by saying that because this case
dealt with conflict preemption, the dissent’s insistence upon a clear statement of
preemptive intent was not required. Actual conflict preemption does not require the
intent to preempt the state law, but rather a federal objective that would be hindered
by the state action. Id. at 884-85.
130
See Bough & Johnson, supra note 54, at 34 (citing the attorneys for Alexis
Geier as saying that the preemption holding was a very narrow one, and was a victory
for consumers).
131
E.g., Raeker-Jordan, supra note 13, at 2 (arguing that Geier “removed any
protections the presumption provided to federalism principles”); Davis, supra note 2, at
971 (stating that Geier along with other recent court holdings has effectively erased the
presumption against preemption, and instead created a presumption in favor of
preemption).
132
See Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 (recognizing that when it had previously dealt
with the same statute it had left open the question of how the saving clause affected
the express preemption clause).
133
Id. at 867-69. The Geier holding has been criticized for not defining,
“ordinary preemption principles.” See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 13, at 12. While such
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This holding should be viewed as an extension of the
Court’s relatively recent interpretations of express preemption
clauses. In 1992, the Supreme Court decided in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, that the express preemption clause in the
federal law dealing with labeling on cigarette packs preempted
any claim for failure to warn about the dangers of cigarette
smoking.134 In the Cipollone holding, Justice Stevens, writing
for the plurality, advocated a narrow reading of any express
preemption clause.135 Although Cipollone generated some doubt
as to whether an express preemption clause prohibited an
implied preemption analysis,136 Justice Thomas made clear in
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick137 that Cipollone did not hold that
the existence of an express preemption clause categorically
foreclosed an implied preemption analysis. 138
Based on Cipollone, Justice Thomas’s conclusion in
Freightliner is entirely logical. For example, suppose Congress
had enacted an express preemption clause as part of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act,139 and the clause was narrowly
interpreted by a court not to preempt all common law actions.140
a definition might have been useful from a completeness standpoint, the lack thereof
should not be viewed as a fatal flaw in Justice Breyer’s reasoning. In stating that
“ordinary preemption principles apply,” he was simply referring to the Court’s long
history of preemption holdings, which have been previously summarized by several
courts and did not necessarily need to be repeated. E.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496
U.S. 71, 78-79 (1990) (describing the three circumstances under which Congress can be
said to have preempted state law, express preemption, field preemption, and conflict
preemption); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-369 (1986) (providing a
brief synopsis of the preemption doctrine); Jones v. Rath Packing, 430 U.S. 519, 525526 (1976) (providing a summary of the presumption against preemption and the ways
federal law can preempt state law).
134
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-531 (1992)
(summarizing the Court’s holding).
135
See id. at 529 (explaining how the express preemption clause should be
“fairly but narrowly construed”).
136
See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (“According to
respondents and the Court of Appeals, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, held that implied
preemption cannot exist when Congress has chosen to include an express preemption
clause in a statute.”).
137
Id. Like Geier, Freightliner also dealt with the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, however in that case, Justice Thomas chose to reach the holding
without addressing the saving clause. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 (interpreting
Freightliner as not addressing the saving clause).
138
Freightliner, 514 U.S. at 288-89.
139
7 U.S.C. § 602 (2000).
140
The plaintiff in Geier, as well as several commentators, have advocated
this type of narrow reading of preemption clauses. See Brief for Petitioner at 18-25,
Geier (arguing that the wording of the Safety Act’s express preemption clause shows
that it does not preempt state common law actions, this position was rejected by the
Court in its holding); Michael L. Russell, Beyond Geier: Federalism Faces an Uncertain
Future, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 69, 83-85 (2000) (reviewing how many state
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Pursuant to the Act, the Department of Agriculture
promulgated a regulation stating that all avocados sold in
interstate commerce must contain no more than 7% oil.
However, suppose a California court, interpreting a California
state regulation, declared that an avocado had to contain
between 8% and 10% oil in order for it to be considered ripe. In
this scenario, it would be impossible to obey both federal and
state requirements.141 Therefore, in accordance with the
Supremacy Clause, the Department of Agriculture’s regulation
must be allowed to implicitly preempt the California
regulation. Otherwise, no out-of-state avocados could be
brought into California.142 This same concern applies to Justice
Breyer’s interpretation of the saving clause. If the saving
clause were interpreted to foreclose all preemption, then a
situation could arise where the states, through common law,
could achieve what they could not through positive
enactments—the nullification of a federal act.143
Thus, in deciding Geier, the Court preserved Congress’s
power to regulate uniformly across the nation. In a situation
such as Geier, if the District of Columbia, through common law,
declared that a manufacturer was negligent for not installing
airbags in cars made in 1984, that decision would have ripple
effects throughout the nation.144 Due to the mobile nature of the
supreme courts, before Geier, had held that the Safety Act’s dual express preemption
and saving clauses acted to preserve almost all state common law actions); Carroll,
supra note 14, at 820-823 (arguing that an express preemption clause, along with a
saving clause and the presumption against preemption, should be interpreted together
to indicate that Congress had not intended to preempt any state tort claims, and that
the majority in Geier had held incorrectly). However, just such a narrow interpretation
was what Justice Scalia was concerned about in his concurrence/dissent from the
Cipollone holding. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 547-48 (Scalia, J. concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). In addition to advocating a narrow reading of
the express preemption clause, Justice Stevens in Cipollone had also declared that
when an act contains an express preemption clause, no implied preemption analysis
should be undertaken. Id. at 517. However, Justice Scalia rightly pointed out that
these two holdings would produce a result whereby states could be allowed to impose
regulations entirely contrary to the federal law. Id. at 547-548 (Scalia, J. concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
141
See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (asserting that in a
situation where it is impossible to meet both the federal and state regulation, that
implied preemption dictated that the state regulation could not stand).
142
Cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143
(1964) (giving a hypothetical similar to this one, however not considering the express
preemption clause).
143
See Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000) (discussing
the effects of the saving clause).
144
Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (arguing, in relation to
the Commerce Clause, that even a small individual farmer’s actions can have an effect
on the national economy).
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nation’s economy, in which cars can be bought and sold in
many different states, such a holding would force all car
manufacturers to meet the standards of the strictest state on a
given issue.145 This rule would allow a small group of states, or
even a single state, to frustrate congressional objectives of
uniformity and potentially unilaterally establish the safety
standards for the entire nation.146 By declaring that “ordinary
preemption” principles still apply in the presence of a saving
clause, the Court in Geier was trying to establish a functional
standard that other courts could use, rather than a formalistic
approach which would have truly represented a “seismic
shift”147 in the preemption doctrine.
While this holding may appear to be at odds with the
presumption against preemption, the federalism arguments in
favor of allowing implied preemption are similar to those used
to justify the presumption against preemption.148 Although it is
true, as commentators and Justices alike have agreed, that the
presumption against preemption is in place to protect the
federalist structure of our government,149 it should not be
forgotten that the Framers of the Constitution also believed the
federal government should, when appropriate, regulate the
entire nation uniformly.150 Justice Stevens argued for the
dissent in Geier that the presumption against preemption acts
as a safeguard to maintain the federal-state balance.151 A true
145

See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 113-116 (2000) (noting, in its
preemption discussion, the out-of-state effects of four Washington State maritime laws,
and holding that each law was preempted, in part, because of the laws out-of-state
effects); Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 60, at 346-47.
146
Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 60, at 346-47; Geier, 529
U.S. at 872 (arguing in favor of allowing ordinary preemption principles to apply by
noting that if ordinary preemption principles did not apply, then Congress would have
created a law, which by design would have been self-defeating).
147
Davis, supra note 2, at 1012 (“Geier represents a seismic shift in the
Court's preemption doctrine.).
148
See discussion supra Part II.B (describing how the Articles of
Confederation were too weak because they lacked an appropriate enforcement
measure, and how the Framers believed that the Supremacy Clause would provide this
enforcement mechanism).
149
Carroll, supra note 14, at 805-08 (discussing how the evolution of the
presumption against preemption was an attempt by the court to regulate the federal
structure and in the 1980’s was a response to growing federal power); Geier, 529 U.S.
at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Our presumption against preemption is rooted in the
concept of federalism.”).
150
See discussion supra Part II.A. See also Supreme Court 1999, Leading
Cases, supra note 58, at 347 (stating that the problem of different states present
disparate regulatory schemes was among those that the Framers intended to prevent
when they gave the federal government the power to regulate the nation uniformly).
151
Geier, 529 U.S. at 907-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
presumption against preemption acts to ensure that Congress and not the Judiciary
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balance, however, should require a quid pro quo between the
federal and state governments: just as the federal government
should not be allowed to usurp the state’s power,152 the Court
should not be too quick to allow the states to usurp the federal
government’s duly apportioned powers.153 Allowing all state
common law actions to be preserved by the saving clause would
be just as dangerous to the federal-state balance as ignoring
the presumption against preemption and allowing the express
preemption clause to trump all state common law actions.154
In keeping with this need for balance, Justice Breyer’s
reading of the express preemption clause in light of the saving
clause should not be seen as a one-sided ruling in favor of the
powers of the federal government.155 This interpretation may
appear to create some “tension”156 between the “polar magnetic
field[s]” of the express preemption clause and the saving
clause.157 Justice Stevens in Cipollone158 stated that a conjoined
strikes the appropriate federal-state balance). Justice Stevens wrote that it is the
structural safeguards “inherent in the normal operation of the legislative process” that
will guarantee that the balance is maintained between the power of the federal
government and that of the state. Id. at 907.
152
See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc. 471 U.S. 707,
707 (1985) (stating that to assume all state regulations are preempted simply because
a federal agency has produced a complex set of regulations in a given area would be
“inconsistent with the federal-state balance” the court has strived to maintain in its
Supremacy Clause decisions).
153
It is interesting to note that four of the five justices who voted in the
majority in Geier have in the past two decades been the most active champions of
“states rights.” Those justices are Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy. See Russell, supra note 142, at 89 (2000) (speculating as
to reasons why Justices O’Connor and Scalia, traditionally conservative “states rights”
justices, voted in the majority). See also Herman Schwartz, The States’ Rights Assault
on Federal Authority, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 155,
155-67 (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002) (arguing that these four justices, along with
Justice Thomas, have combined to form a solid conservative majority that strongly
favors states rights).
154
See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (holding that, as a rule
of statutory interpretation, Congressional intent must be clear before a court can hold
that Congress has “significantly changed the federal-state balance”).
155
See Geier, 529 U.S. at 871 (discussing how Congress had inserted the
saving clause in order to indicate that it still intended to allow for the compensation of
victims).
156
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (discussing
Congress’s occupation of the field of nuclear energy and its desire to maintain common
law liability).
157
M. Stuart Madden, Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State Safety
Obligations, 21 PACE L. REV. 103, 158 (2000) (lamenting what he perceived to be the
Court’s failure to reconcile Cipollone’s favoring of the express preemption clause and
Geier’s favoring of the saving clause).
158
This argument is based on a statement the Court made in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in
Cipollone, held that congressional enactment of an express preemption prevision
precludes further preemption analysis. Id. Justice Stevens based this opinion on the
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reading of the express and implied preemption clause, as found
in Geier, violated the interpretive maxim of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. 159 However, the Court pointed out in Geier, as
well as in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,160 that this
interpretive tension is a reflection of a “congressional
compromise”161 between tort law’s traditional compensatory role
in our system and the Federal government’s need to establish
uniform standards.162
Under the Geier opinion, Congress and the DOT’s strong
desire to aid interstate commerce by creating uniform
standards163 is recognized in the express preemption of all
“familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” that Congress’s enactment of
a preemption provision foreclosed preemption being found (or not found) on a different
basis. Id. However, this position was later interpreted and modified by the Court in
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288-89 (1995). In Freightliner, Justice
Thomas held that, at most, a Court could infer from an express preemption clause that
Congress did not intend to preempt beyond the stated express preemptive reach. Id. at
288. As a result, he held that preemption was not explicitly foreclosed for those issues
beyond the express preemption clause’s scope. Id. This interpretation laid the basis for
Justice Breyer’s declaration that the express preemption clause must be read in light of
the saving clause. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869, 872. In addition to the basis created by
Freightliner, Justice Breyer’s interpretation was also consistent with Cipollone in that
he was not stating that the further preemptive scope provided by implied preemption
was in addition to the express preemption. Id. at 870-71. Instead, he was holding that
the saving clause, by preserving common law actions, had created an additional need to
examine implied preemption to ensure that common law actions did not defeat the
congressional objectives for the act. Id. at 871-72.
159
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (7th ed. 1999) (“A canon of construction
holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the
alternative.”).
160
See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256 (stating that the Court recognized that some
tension existed between Congress’s occupation of the field of nuclear energy, and the
Court’s interpretation that common law liability still exists, but explaining that the
Court could not have held any other way because the tension was created by Congress,
and may have been intended as off-setting factors to maintain some local
accountability for nuclear plants).
161
See Geier, 529 U.S. at 871 (observing that the Court recognized that two
policies existed, national uniformity and victim compensation, but that it could find
“nothing in any natural reading of the two” that would indicate a preference of one
policy over the other). See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Affirmance at 15, Geier (dismissing any tension within the Safety Act as
being a product of Congress’s intentional compromise between the “interests in
uniformity and [the need to allow] States to compensate accident victims” as
represented in the inclusion of both an express preemption and a saving clause).
162
Geier, 529 U.S. at 870-71 (interpreting the language in the express
preemption and saving clauses to be a neutral reflection of Congress’s dual goals of
national uniformity and victim compensation). See also Rogers v. Cosco, Inc., 737
N.E.2d 1158, 1165 (Ind. App. Ct. 2000) (interpreting the Safety Act’s having both a
preemption and a saving clause as a “congressional compromise” between a national
interest in uniformity and a local interest in compensating accident victims based upon
common law tort standards).
163
Geier, 529 U.S. at 871 (“[T]he preemption provision itself reflects a desire
to subject the industry to a single, uniform set of federal safety standards.”).
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positive state legislative enactment.164 At the same time, the
Geier holding preserves the important role the states play in
compensating victims so long as this compensation system does
not obstruct Congress’s objectives for the federal regulation.165
While the tension created by this holding makes it impossible
to create a single bright-line-rule,166 it strikes the appropriate
balance between Congress’s desire to enact uniform legislation
and the states’ need to compensate victims.
B.

Geier and the Presumption Against Preemption

As has been alluded to above, Geier did not “eradicate
the presumption against preemption.”167 Instead, the Court
found that an appropriate examination of the traditional
preemption factors showed that the regulation in question
overcame the presumption.168 The presumption has never been
interpreted to mean that the federal government should never
preempt state law.169 Rather, it is important that the Court
should not inhibit Congress’s attempts to regulate an
industry.170

164

Id.
Id. (stating that “occasional nonuniformity is a small price to pay for a
system” that allows juries to establish standards and thereby compensate victims);
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 15, Geier
(arguing that so long as implied preemption is preserved there is no reason to think
that “tort liability will impair the purpose of the [Safety] Act”).
166
See Russell, supra note 142, at 91 (stating with dismay that “[t]he Court
passed on an . . . opportunity to clarify the law of federal pre-emption,” and ended up
just raising more questions); Carroll, supra note 13, at 800 (expressing a concern that
the preemption doctrine after Cipollone, including Geier, has been “vague and
overlapping,” and has created a situation where lower courts have had a very hard
time consistently applying the rules).
167
Raeker-Jordan, supra note 12, at 1 (quoting from the title of the article).
168
Geier, 529 U.S. at 885 (“While we certainly accept the dissent’s basic
position that a court should not find pre-emption too readily in the absence of clear
evidence of a conflict, for the reasons set out above we find such evidence here.”)
(internal citations omitted). Contra Geier, 529 U.S. at 906-907 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority simply ignored the presumption against preemption).
169
See CSX Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (“[A] court
interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state
law will be reluctant to find preemption.”) (emphasis added). Contra Raeker-Jordan,
supra note 12, at 31 (arguing that the presumption against preemption forces the
Court in deciding Geier to assume that Congress did not see any conflict between
federal and state law, and therefore the presumption mandates the Court not to find a
conflict).
170
Supreme Court 1999 Term, Leading Cases, supra note 60, at 347.
165
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Justice Stevens and several commentators171 have
criticized the Court’s narrow application of the presumption
because it granted too much power to the federal government
to govern an issue that the states had traditionally occupied.172
Justice Stevens even went so far as to imply that the majority
had ignored the presumption against preemption entirely.173
Most of these critics would have preferred that physical
impossibility conflict preemption be the only form of implied
conflict preemption.174 However, if the Court had taken such a
narrow approach to implied preemption it would have overly
limited Congress’s constitutional powers.175 Since early in the
presumption’s history, it has been clear that implied and
obstacle preemption both provide sufficient justification for
overcoming the presumption.176 If the Court insisted on physical
171

Geier, 529 U.S. at 907-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also id. at 885
(Breyer, J., majority) (interpreting the dissent’s position as stating that in “frustrationof-purpos[e]” cases where the agency does not declare its preemptive intent, the dissent
would prefer the state action be clearly an obstacle to the congressional purpose than
have the state action be preempted); Nelson, supra note 2, at 231-32 (“Under the
Supremacy Clause, preemption occurs if and only if state law contradicts a valid rule
established by federal law. . . .”), Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal
Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 622-27 (1997) (proposing that
only situations where state law and federal law can not both be satisfied, are the only
situations where preemption should occur). But see Geier, 529 U.S. at 908 n.22
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (responding to Professor Nelson’s proposition by saying that
the presumption protects against an over reaching federal judiciary, and dismissing
Nelson’s request to limit all of preemption).
172
See Russell, supra note 142, at 91 (arguing that there was an ambiguity as
to Congress’s preemptive intent in the Safety Act and that the presumption against
preemption would dictate that there was no preemption, ultimately concluding that the
presumption may no longer exist); Davis, supra note 2, at 1012-1013 (proposing that
Geier represents a “seismic shift” in the Court’s interpretation of preemption cases,
that the Court has re-written the presumption, and in fact created an assumption in
favor of preemption).
173
Geier, 529 U.S. at 907-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174
Carroll, supra note 13, at 820-822 (stating that “physical impossibility”
should functionally be the only form of preemption the court recognizes absent a clear
statement by Congress as to their preemptive intent); Davis, supra note 2, at 1014
(asserting that in a “perfect world of preemption doctrine” implied preemption would
only be based on occupation of the field and physical impossibility conflict).
175
Even Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent in Geier, argued that it
should be Congress’s role to maintain the proper federal-state balance. Geier, 529 U.S.
at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The signal virtues of this presumption [against
preemption] are its placement of the power of pre-emption squarely in the hands of
Congress, which is far more suited than the Judiciary to strike the appropriate
state/federal balance . . . .”). If that were the case, then limiting implied conflict
preemption only to physical impossibility conflict preemption would constrain
Congress’s ability to regulate that balance.
176
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (saying after its
famous interpretation of the presumption, that Congress’s “clear and manifest
purpose” could be “evidenced in several ways,” including that “the object sought to be
obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal
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impossibility before declaring implied preemption, then
Congress would never be able to mandate anything more than
minimum standards.177 A “physical impossibility only” rule like
the one proposed would create a “one-way ratchet” that would
limit the federal government’s effectiveness178 Congress could
establish one standard, and then any state could establish
overlapping stricter standards that merely make it physically
possible to comply with both the federal and state laws.179 Such
a ruling could in effect eviscerate the purpose behind any
federal law.180 Unless Congress went out of its way to detail the
entire possible preemptive scope of every law and regulation,181
Congress would never be able to “expand industry discretion or
to lower tort standards.”182
In Geier, there were numerous indications of the DOT’s
intent behind FMVSS 208, and it was clear that if the Court
allowed Geier’s claim to continue, it would have greatly
interfered with the DOT’s objectives.183 This is why the Court
found substantial weight to overcome the presumption against
preemption, and did not, as suggested, ignore the presumption
altogether.184 In Geier, the Court was interpreting a regulation
passed by an agency under the authority granted it by
Congress.185 By combining the DOT’s long-held explanation of
the same purpose . . . . Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the
objective of the federal statute”).
177
Geier, 529 U.S. at 908 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (refuting
commentator’s calls for the elimination of all frustration-of-purpose preemption, by
arguing that the presumption against preemption can eliminate the dangers of judicial
overreaching).
178
Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 60, at 344.
179
Id.
180
Id. (declaring that a pure physical impossibility conflict preemption only
doctrine would be “intractable” as a functional solution because it would “allow state
courts to frustrate congressional will by setting countervailing tort standards”).
181
See Geier, 529 U.S. at 884 (rejecting the dissent’s proposal that the Court
require an “agency statement of preemptive intent as a prerequisite to” finding conflict
preemption). Justice Breyer pointed out that, unlike express preemption conflict
preemption, physical impossibility preemption turns on the existence of an actual
conflict that would inhibit the federal law. Id. He continued by stating that it is safe to
assume that the federal government would not take the time to write a law or
regulation only to have it superceded by state law. Id. at 885.
182
Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 60,at 344.
183
Geier, 529 U.S. at 877-82 (stating the reasons provided by the DOT for
implementing FMVSS 208).
184
Id. at 883 (asserting that the majority was not placing the burden on the
plaintiffs to show there was not preemption, but rather holding that the DOT’s
arguments in favor of conflict were more persuasive than Geier’s arguments against
preemption).
185
Id. (noting that Congress had delegated to the DOT the needed authority
to implement the Safety Act).
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the purposes behind FMVSS 208 and the history of the Act as
interpreted in prior Supreme Court cases the Court was able to
accurately determine Department’s intentions for FMVSS
208.186 The Court made clear that the DOT interpreted the
regulation’s objective to be the gradual phase-in of multiple
passive restraint devices.187 This determination was not a
formulaic, statutory approach to discerning the department’s
intent,188 but rather a functional approach that took into
account the real-life factors the Department was evaluating.189
This method of analysis provides lower court judges enough
flexibility to interpret a statute’s preemptive effect in a
pragmatic manner while curtailing their ability to stray from
the intention of the rule maker.
C.

The Opinion of the Department of Transportation

One of Geier’s final clarifications of the preemption
doctrine is Justice Breyer’s deference to the opinion of the DOT
throughout the holding.190 In fact, the Court’s ultimate holding
that Geier’s claim was implicitly preempted was not the
position advocated by either Geier191 or Honda192 in their briefs
to the Court. Instead, Justice Breyer’s written decision followed
the line of reasoning advocated by the Solicitor General on
behalf of the DOT.193 This use of a federal agency to inform the
186

Id. at 878-880.
Id. at 879.
188
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that even when implied preemption is
the issue, all regulations must declare their preemptive intent with some specificity.
Geier, 529 U.S. at 908 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In response, Justice Breyer rightly
pointed out that to require such a statement in conflict preemption situations would
simply be too rigid an approach, and would lead to a nullification of the regulation
which the “agency, and therefore Congress, is most unlikely to have intended.” Id. at
885.
189
See Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 60, at 343 (“The
Court’s implied preemption analysis in Geier reflects a victory of function over form.”).
This more functional approach is also in line with prior cases’ approaches to the
interpretation of Congress’s intent. In Jones v. Rath Packing, Justice Thurgood
Marshall declared that an inquiry into Congress’s intent must take into account “the
relationship between state and federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not
merely as they are written.” 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1976).
190
Geier, 529 U.S. at 883-884 (explaining why the majority was relying on the
opinion of the DOT).
191
See discussion supra note 98 (discussing the argument Geier presented in
her brief).
192
See discussion supra note 86 (discussing the argument Honda presented in
its brief).
193
See discussion supra note 103 (discussing the argument the Solicitor
General presented in its brief on behalf of the DOT). See also Bough & Johnson, supra
note 56, at 34 (noting that Justice Breyer in Geier “adopted almost verbatim” the
187
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Court is both appropriate and beneficial to future courts
dealing with complex federal regulations preempting state
actions.194
Justice Breyer’s conclusions about the role the DOT
should play in the preemption analysis are in line with the
Supreme Court’s holding in several previous cases. As far back
as Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.195 in 1945, the Court
has held that an administrative interpretation of a regulation
is controlling unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.”196 In addition, so long as an agency is
acting within its congressionally-delegated power, that agency
may independently preempt a state action.197 Thus, in City of
New York v. F.C.C.,198 the Court combined its previous holdings
and made clear that both the intent of Congress and the intent
of the agency should be considered when determining the
preemptive reach of a regulation.199 More recently, in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr,200 the Court examined whether the Food and Drug
Administration’s (FDA) approval of a medical device preempted
a state action for negligence and strict liability.201 In Medtronic,
opinion of the Solicitor General). Bough & Johnson argued that the majority’s adoption
of the Solicitor General’s opinion in fact helped to limit the scope of the preemption
holding. Id. They noted that the Solicitor General and the Court both left open the door
for suits against manufacturers for specific defects in the design of the restraints; a
door that may not have been open had the Court found express preemption. Id.
194
See Geier, 529 U.S. at 883 (commenting on the complex nature of the issues
surrounding FMVSS 208 and asserting that the agency is “likely to have a thorough
understanding of its own regulation”).
195
325 U.S. 410 (1945) (dealing with an interpretation of the General
Maximum Price Regulation by the Office of Price Administration, the Court held that
when considering an administrative regulation the ultimate criterion should be the
administrative interpretation).
196
Id. at 414.
197
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (describing how
the F.C.C. could preempt state depreciation charges, though ultimately holding that
the F.C.C. lacked the jurisdiction to do so).
198
486 U.S. 57 (1988) (holding that the F.C.C. clearly had intended to displace
all technical standards governing the quality of cable TV signals, and that such a
decision was within the agency’s congressionally delegated authority).
199
Id. at 64. In City of New York, the Court first drew upon precedent to make
clear that a regulation created by a federal agency, acting within its appropriately
delegated authority, will have just as much preemptive force as a law passed by
Congress. Id. Next, the Court stated that in such situations a narrow focus on just the
preemptive intent of Congress would be misdirected. Id. Rather that focus should be
placed on the powers and intent of the agency to which the authority was delegated. Id.
200
518 U.S. 470, 495-496 (1996).
201
Id. at 474. The issue was over a grandfather clause under which certain
medical devices could be approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) without
having to undergo the rigorous pre-market approval process. Id. at 477. The Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) allowed certain medical devices that were
“substantially similar” to those in existence before 1976 to be approved without
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as in Geier, the primary question was not whether the federal
statute had preempted the state action, but rather whether the
FDA requirements for approval preempted the action.202 By
determining that the FDA was in a unique position because it
had originally promulgated the regulation; the Court in
MedTronic gave “substantial weight to the agency’s view of the
statute.”203 Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with the
conclusion reached by the FDA, holding that its approval
requirements do not preempt state action.
In light of this history, it is not surprising that Justice
Breyer would defer to the opinion advocated by the DOT in
Geier. If Congress’s intent is the “touchstone” of any
preemption analysis of a congressional statute,204 then the
position of an agency should hold the same position in the
preemption analysis of a regulation. Unlike Congress, however,
an agency is normally required to speak in a single voice as to
the reasons underlying its regulations205 and can even file briefs
as amicus curiae to the Court expressing its opinion about the
regulation.206 The agency’s single voice means that its
preemptive intent is normally much simpler to discern. It is
important to note that in both Medtronic and Geier (and as will
be seen later in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine207) the agency
opinion the Court referred to was not one that the agency had
adopted in preparation for litigation, but rather one that had
been either part of the original regulations as they were
promulgated,208 or were a long expressed opinion of the
agency.209 This distinction is important; it provides a level of
undergoing the approval process. Id. at 477-478. The question before the Supreme
Court was whether a state action for negligent design was preempted by the MDA
when the device in question had not undergone the pre-market approval process. Id. at
478.
202
Id. at 496.
203
Id.
204
Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
205
See, e.g., Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) (referring to the FDA
regulations implementing the process to request an advisory opinion from the FDA
about whether a state requirement is preempted by the statute).
206
See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Affirmance at 15-30, Geier (explaining the DOT’s opinion that FMVSS 208 implicitly
preempted Geier’s claim).
207
See discussion infra Part V.B.
208
See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496-497.
209
See Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883-884 (2000) (noting
that the opinion of the DOT was one they had advocated “consistently over time”). In
fact, Justice Breyer, made a point to note that the Court had no reason to suspect the
DOT’s position to be anything other than its “‘fair and considered judgment on the
matter.’” Id. at 884 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-462 (1997)). He also
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reliability to the agency’s opinion.210 This combination of
efficiency and reliability in the use of agency opinions should
and has guided courts in their preemption holdings.211
V.

PRODUCT LIABILITY PREEMPTION SINCE GEIER

As a statement of recent Supreme Court thinking on
preemption, Geier has been referenced as a model for how to
approach a preemption case, especially cases involving both an
express preemption clause and a saving clause. Except for
areas where lower courts have interpreted a federal regulation
as offering the defendant a choice, most of these courts have
approvingly cited Geier’s interpretation of the express
preemption and saving clause, but have shown restraint in
following Geier in preempting state law actions.212 Several of
these cases have preserved the presumption against
preemption by distinguishing those statutes that offer
defendants a choice and those that represent a minimum
standard.213 The Supreme Court in Sprietsma v. Mercury
Marine recently supported many of the lower courts’
interpretations that Geier did not indicate a shift to more
preemption, but rather showed a flexible approach to the
complex problem of interpreting an express preemption and
saving clause together.214

distinguished the Court’s opinion in Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc.
where the F.C.C. had not, at any time, concluded that a conflict existed between the
federal and state regulations. Id. (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab.,
Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721 (1985)).
210
See id.
211
See Oxygenated Fuels Assoc. Inc. v. Davis, 331 F.3d 665, 672 (9th Cir.
2003) (distinguishing Geier on the grounds that the Supreme Court’s opinion was
consistent with that of the DOT, whereas in Oxygenated Fuels the EPA had not
expressed an opinion concerning preemption, and therefore any comparison between
the two cases must be viewed in that light).
212
See, e.g., Colon v. BIC USA Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(interpreting the Consumer Product Safety Act’s express preemption and saving
clauses to allow implied preemption, but ultimately holding that the plaintiff’s action
was not preempted).
213
See, e.g., Stone v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D. Mass.
2002) (drawing a distinction between regulations that offered a choice and those simply
requiring an action be taken, holding that the regulation in question fell into the latter
category and therefore did not preempt the state action).
214
See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 729 N.E.2d 45, 49-50, 63 (2002) (finding
that the Federal Boat Safety Act’s express preemption and saving clauses should be
read together to allow implied preemption, but ultimately holding that the Coast
Guard’s decision not to regulate propeller guards did not preempt a state action which
required propeller guards).
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Geier’s Influence Interpreting Express Preemption and
Saving Clauses

Justice Breyer’s interpretation of the saving and express
preemption clauses has clearly been the most recognized
holding to result from the Geier decision.215 Nevertheless,
contrary to the opinion expressed by several commentators,216
the decision has not lead to a vast number of courts using
implied preemption to expand federal powers and usurp state’s
actions.217 In fact, several circuits have overruled pre-Geier
district court rulings of express preemption and reinstated
previously preempted cases.218 These holdings have shown that
Justice Breyer’s interpretation of the preemption and saving
clauses has had the result that he had anticipated—it has
preserved what he saw as Congress’s intent to encourage

215

The Supreme Court has referenced Geier for this point at least two times
since the case was handed down. First, in 2001 Chief Justice Rehnquist referenced
Geier for the idea that neither an express preemption nor a saving clause will bar the
ordinary working of preemption. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,
352 (2001). In late 2002, Justice Stevens expressly referred to Geier in his
interpretation of Federal Boating Safety Act’s express preemption and saving clauses.
Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 52. Additionally, lower courts have referenced Geier for this
point in numerous diverse cases. See, e.g., Russell v. Sprint Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 955,
961 (D. Kan. 2003) (holding that because of its saving clause, the Federal
Communications Act does not preempt all state and local regulations regarding market
entry, or rate changes by a cell phone service company); Secured Envtl. Mgmt., Inc. v.
Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n, 97 S.W.3d 246 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002)
(referencing Geier in declaring that because of the Federal Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act’s saving clause, a particular state’s hazardous waste statute is only
preempted if it conflicts with the goals of the federal act).
216
See e.g., Alexander K. Haas, Casenote, Chipping Away at State Tort
Remedies Through Pre-emption Jurisprudence: Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 89
CAL. L. REV. 1927 (2001) (declaring that Geier strengthens the power of the federal
government to preempt state laws, and implying that the holding will lead to fewer
individuals being able to sue); Davis, supra note 2, at 1015 (declaring that the Supreme
Court’s preemption doctrine provides a preference for preemption that would lead to
more preemption); Jack B. Weinstein, The Restatement of Torts and the Courts, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1439, 1442 (2001) (stating that the modern preemption doctrine makes
him nervous for the “bottom-up” protection of jury-decided cases).
217
See Bough & Johnson, supra note 56, at 34 (noting that the attorneys for
Alexis Geier believed that the holding was a victory for plaintiffs and consumers
because it flat out rejected Honda’s express preemption argument, and narrowly
construed implied preemption based on choice).
218
See, e.g., Leipart v. Guardian Indus., Inc., 234 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000)
(using Geier’s interpretation of the Safety Act’s preemption and saving clauses as an
analogy, the Circuit Court overruled a pre-Geier district court holding which said that
the Consumer Product Safety Act preempted a plaintiff’s common law product liability
and tort claims); Choate v. Champion Home Builders, 222 F.3d 788, 793 (10th Cir.
2000) (following the Supreme Court’s holding in Geier to declare that the plaintiff’s
claims were neither expressly or implicitly preempted by the Manufactured Housing
Act).
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uniform standards across the country while preserving the
“necessary compensation to victims.”219
The effect of Justice Breyer’s interpretation is
fundamental to any preemption decision involving similar
preemption clauses. Several lower courts, when interpreting
similar clauses, have first declared that the express preemption
and saving clauses preserve the “ordinary working” of the
preemption doctrine,220 and then have examined whether the
federal law or regulation conflicts with the state action.221 Just a
few months after the Supreme Court handed down Geier, the
Tenth Circuit decided Choate v. Champion Home Builders.222 In
Choate, the manufacturers of a home were defending against a
product liability action for not installing a battery powered
back up smoke detector in the plaintiff’s home.223 Before the
Geier decision had been released, the District Court in Choate
held that the National Manufactured Housing Construction
and Safety Standards Act of 1974 (Housing Construction Act)
expressly and implicitly preempted the plaintiff’s suit.224
Following Geier, the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court,
holding that the Housing Construction Act could implicitly
preempt a common law suit even though there was no express
preemption.225
The Tenth Circuit next examined whether the plaintiff’s
claims would conflict with the objectives of the Housing
Construction Act and thereby be implicitly preempted.226 The
Circuit looked at the language of the act, stating that Congress
had made clear that its objective was to supervise the
manufactured housing industry.227 Additionally, the Circuit
219

Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 871 (2000) (stating that one
reason for his allowing implied preemption to persist was Congress’s dual goals of
uniformity and victim compensation).
220
See id. at 869.
221
See, e.g., Choate, 222 F.3d at 793 (discussing the effects the Manufactured
Housing Act’s saving clause had on the act’s express preemption clause, referring
approvingly to Geier’s interpretation of similar clauses); Stone v. Frontier Airlines Inc.,
256 F. Supp. 2d 28, 40 (D. Mass. 2002) (citing both Geier and Sprietsma for the
proposition that a saving clause and an express preemption clause should be read to
allow some cases to not be preempted).
222
222 F.3d at 788. Choate was decided in July of 2000, and Geier was decided
in May of 2000.
223
Id. at 790.
224
Id. The lower court decision is unpublished.
225
Id. at 792-94. (finding that the language for the express and saving clauses
in the Manufactured Housing Construction Act was similar to the language at issue in
Geier).
226
Id. at 794.
227
Choate, 222 F.3d at 795.
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Court held that the language of the regulation in question
established a minimum standard.228 The Circuit Court
distinguished the holding in Geier on the grounds that FMVSS
208 gave the auto manufacturers a choice whereas the
regulation at issue in Choate set a minimum safety standard
for all housing construction.229 The Tenth Circuit’s decision
demonstrates how the Geier preemption analysis is a highly
functional approach, but does not demand the outcome of
preemption in every case.230
Choate stands as an example of how a number of cases
have applied Geier without finding implied preemption.231 In
Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA Inc.,232 the defendants relied
heavily on Cipollone in arguing that the express preemption
clause of the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) preempted
the plaintiff’s common law product liability action.233 The
Southern District of New York, however, declared that because
the CPSA contained a saving clause, Geier and not Cipollone
should control.234 The Southern District also held that the
CPSA’s regulations concerning disposable butane lighters
228

Id. The circuit court held that the federal regulation was a minimum
standard because the regulation simply required that a house have a hardwired smoke
detector installed. Id. The regulation did not provide alternatives (e.g. a hardwired
smoke detector or a battery operated smoke detector) and it did not require that
hardwiring be the only form of power to the smoke detector. Id. Therefore, since the
federal law, and the proposed state requirement of a battery back up for a hardwired
smoke detector were not mutually exclusive, and since the federal regulation did not
prohibit additional regulation of smoke detectors, the Tenth Circuit held that the
federal regulation was a minimum standard. Id. See also Geier v. Am. Honda Motors
Co., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000) (stating that the express preemption clause read in light
of the saving clause “preserves those actions that seek to establish greater safety than
the minimum safety achieved by a federal regulation intended to provide a floor”).
229
Choate, 222 F.3d at 796.
230
See Bough & Johnson, supra note 56, at 33 (arguing that Geier does not
mandate preemption in every situation, citing Choate as an example, where the same
analysis as Geier was used, but where no preemption was found, because the state
common law action in question could be seen to improve or support the federal
objectives).
231
So far, however, most courts have held that Geier’s interpretation is most
applicable to express preemption and saving clauses that are similarly worded to those
in the Safety Act. See, e.g., Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323 (5th Cir.
2003) (holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act’s “savings
clause,” which only preserves a state’s regulating authority over federally registered
pesticides, and does not mention common law actions, does not alter the Act’s express
preemption clause’s preemption of a common law failure to warn action).
232
136 F. Supp. 2d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
233
Id. at 203.
234
Id. at 204 & n.7 (stating that “unlike the CPSA, the Public Health and
Cigarette Safety Act [the act at issue in Cipollone] does not contain a saving clause[;]”
also noting that all the cases cited by the defense were decided before Geier, and so did
not take that holding into account).
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established a minimum standard.235 Consequently, in
accordance with Geier, the court held that the regulations did
not implicitly preempt the plaintiff’s action.236 The Ninth Circuit
also came to the same conclusion when it examined the CPSA
in Leipart v. Guardian Industries, Inc.237
In addition to Geier’s influence on the court’s
interpretation of the CPSA, the District of Massachusetts held
in Stone v. Frontier Airlines, Inc.,238 that in accordance with the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Geier and in Sprietsma, the
Airline Deregulation Act’s saving clause should be read to
preserve some measure of airline related common law actions.239
The court held that Massachusetts’ interest in preserving the
health and safety of its citizens through tort law remedies
overrode the federal interest in uniformity.240
B.

Choice Versus Minimum Standards and the
Presumption Against Preemption

Although Geier may have had an important effect on
how lower courts interpret express preemption clauses,241 lower
courts have not taken the decision as carte blanche to “[run]
amok with our potentially boundless . . . doctrine of implied
conflict pre-emption . . . .”242 In what could be referred to as a
triumph of the presumption against preemption, many courts
have applied Justice Breyer’s approach in Geier without finding
the state action to have been impliedly preempted.243 Those
235

Id. at 207 (“The CPSC regulations establish general, rudimentary and
minimal requirements . . . [that] do not specify design alternatives or production
methods from which manufacturers may choose . . . .”). This interpretation as a
minimum requirement due to the lack of alternatives was cited by the court as a major
distinction between Colon and Geier. Id. at n. 14.
236
Id. at 207-209 (holding that the plaintiff’s claims would not obstruct
Congress’s objectives for the CPSC and would in fact be consistent with those
objectives).
237
234 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that in light of the Court’s decision
in Geier, the CPSA did not expressly or implicitly preempt the plaintiff’s action,
because the saving clause preserved some common law actions, and the CPSA’s
regulations represented minimum standards as opposed to the choices represented in
Geier).
238
256 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D. Mass. 2002).
239
Id. at 40.
240
Id. at 47.
241
See Haas, supra note 219, at 1949 (asserting that Geier “provides clear
guidelines to lower courts” in handling preemption cases).
242
Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J.
dissenting).
243
See, e.g., Great Dane v. Wells, 52 S.W.3d 737, 749 (Tex. 2001) (stating that
the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant’s car trailer had been defectively designed with
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courts have often done so based on Justice Breyer’s central
observation that FMVSS 208 offered manufacturers a choice,244
without which the regulation would have represented a
minimum standard above which the states were free to
regulate.245
This principle of choice versus minimum standards has
most clearly been displayed in recent cases involving a variety
of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs). Since all
the FMVSSs are propagated under the Safety Act, the
arguments in these cases have not been over the preemptive
reach of the express preemption clause,246 but rather whether
the regulation was intended to offer the manufacturer a choice
or only set a minimum standard.247 If the regulation was not
intended to provide a choice, courts have often decided that the
state action is not preempted.248
The diverging outcome of two Eighth Circuit cases,
Harris v. Great Dane249 and Griffith v. General Motors,250 is just
too little reflective tape was not implicitly preempted by FMVSS 108, which regulated
the amount of tape that should appear on car trailers, because that regulation was only
a minimum standard); Rogers v. Cosco, Inc., 737 N.E.2d 1158, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that FMVSS 213’s allowance of the use of a booster seat, but not
requiring its use, represented only a minimum standard, and the plaintiff’s action to
prohibit the use of booster seats for children under forty pounds represented a
permissible attempt to impose a greater safety standard than that advocated by the
DOT).
244
Geier, 529 U.S. at 881 (holding that the plaintiff’s claim would have
established a duty on the part of all manufacturers to install airbags in their 1987 cars,
thereby conflicting with the DOT’s intended mix of restraint devices, in effect taking
away from the manufacturers their choice in what restraint system to use).
245
Id. at 868 (arguing that the express preemption clause, without the saving
clause, would preempt all state actions except those that sought to regulate a matter
for which the federal regulation represented only a “minimum safety standard”).
246
Every court that has examined this question has so far ruled that Geier is
controlling over the Safety Act’s express preemption clause as it applied to all FMVSSs.
See e.g., Harris v. Great Dane Trailers, 234 F.3d 398, 399 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Great Dane
concedes that Geier thereby overruled the district court’s decision that Harris’ claim
against Great Dane is expressly preempted.”).
247
E.g., Rogers, 737 N.E.2d at 1165-66 (discussing only this issue of choice
versus minimum standards in its analysis of the regulations implied preemption
scope).
248
Stone v. Frontier Airlines Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 28, 43-44 (D. Mass. 2002)
(stating that the FAA’s regulations represented only a minimum standard, and that in
light of the Act’s saving clause, and in line with the holding in Geier, a minimum
standard was not sufficient to find that the state action would actually conflict with the
federal standard).
249
234 F.3d 398 (8th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff in this case claimed that the
defendant had defectively designed their car trailer with too little reflective tape, which
ultimately caused her husband’s fatal crash. Id. at 399. The defendant responded that
it had complied with the DOT’s regulations regarding reflective devices on car trailers,
and that those regulations implicitly preempted the plaintiff’s claim. Id.
250
303 F.3d 1276 (8th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff claimed that defendant had
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one example of the principle of choice versus minimum
standards. In Harris, the Circuit Court was interpreting the
preemptive effects of MFVSS 108, a DOT safety standard
governing lamps and reflective devices.251 While following
Geier’s interpretation of the Safety Act’s express preemption
and saving clauses,252 the Eighth Circuit distinguished Geier on
the grounds that, unlike FMVSS 208 in Geier, the regulation at
issue in Harris only established a minimum standard, and was
not intended to provide manufacturers with a choice.253 The
Circuit Court held that FMVSS 108 did not prohibit the
addition of more reflective tape than the minimum amount
required.254 The court found that defendant could have been
negligent under state law for designing its trailer with only the
minimum amount of federally required reflective devices.255
In contrast to Harris, the Eighth Circuit in Griffith was
asked to examine different aspect of FMVSS 208—namely, the
requirement that some seats in trucks have either a two-point
or three-point seat belt.256 As in Harris, the Eighth Circuit
Court in Griffith held that the state action might be implicitly
preempted despite the fact that no express preemption was
found.257 The Eighth Circuit framed its decision as a simple
question of whether the regulation was intended as a minimum
standard or whether the regulation established a choice that
the state was forbidden from precluding.258 With this as its
ideological framework the court drew a comparison between
the part of the regulation in Geier and the part in this case.259
The Eighth Circuit found that the DOT had intended the
defectively designed their 1990 Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck because they had
chosen a two-point seat belt for the middle front passenger seat. Id. at 1278. The
defendant countered by saying that FMVSS 208 had specifically allowed them to select
a two-point seat belt for that seat, and therefore the plaintiff’s claim was preempted.
Id.
251
Harris, 234 F.3d at 399.
252
Id.
253
Id. at 403 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that during the period the
DOT was studying the effectiveness of FMVSS 108, that all common law standards
were implicitly preempted; instead holding that the standard required only a minimum
amount of reflective tape, and that any state could, through common law action,
require a greater amount or different configuration of the tape without interfering with
the DOT objectives for the standard).
254
Id. at 401.
255
Id.
256
Griffith v. General Motors, 303 F.3d 1276, 1279 (8th Cir. 2002).
257
Id.
258
Id. at 1280-81 (declaring that the issue in the case is one of intent).
259
Id. at 1281-82 (citing Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 377, 382
(7th Cir.2000) (supporting the Eighth Circuit’s current holding)).
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sections of FMVSS 208 at issue in Griffith to have given auto
manufacturers a choice of what type of seat belt to use.260
Consequently, the Circuit Court held that if the plaintiff’s
action were allowed to proceed, the state would effectively be
eliminating the manufacturer’s ability to choose by declaring
that only one type of seat belt was appropriate.261 As a result,
the court declared that Geier did apply and that the state
action was implicitly preempted.262
Outside of the confines of the Safety Act, this doctrine of
choice versus minimum standard has been used by courts to
limit the implied preemptive effects of several other federal
regulations. As has been shown above, the Tenth Circuit in
Choate v. Champion Home Builders263 found that the federal
regulation requiring hard-wired smoke detectors set only a
minimum standard and did not present homebuilders with a
choice.264 Consequently, the Circuit Court held that the Housing
Construction Act did not preempt the plaintiff’s common law
action.265
Another example comes from Stone v. Frontier Airlines,
266
Inc. In Stone, the District Court of Massachusetts ruled that
the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) regulation
requiring defibrillators on all airplanes did not preempt the
plaintiff’s state common law action.267 The District Court
examined the regulation and stated that the regulation was a
The
court
specifically
minimum
safety
standard.268
distinguished Geier by noting that the FAA’s regulation did not
give the airlines a choice of safety devices.269 Rather, the
District Court ruled that the regulation merely required the
airlines to carry defibrillators by a certain date, and the history
260

Id. at 1282 (holding that the DOT had intended to offer manufacturers a
choice of what restraint system they used, and since the plaintiff’s action would
mandate the choice of one option over another, such action would conflict with the
DOT’s intent for the regulation).
261
Griffith, 303 F.3d at 1282. In so holding, the Eighth Circuit rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that Geier should not apply because in this case the DOT had not
explicitly said that its goal was the gradual phase-in of one particular type of restraint
system. Id. at 1280. Instead, the Circuit Court held that, in accordance with the
holding in Geier, so long as there was a choice offered that was what was controlling,
and no analysis as to why that choice was offered was required. Id. at 1282.
262
Id. at 1282.
263
222 F.3d 788 (10th Cir. 2000).
264
See discussion supra Part V.A.
265
Choate v. Champion House Builders, 222 F.3d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 2000).
266
256 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D. Mass. 2002).
267
Id. at 43.
268
Id.
269
Id. at 44.
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of the regulation showed that a tort law requiring an earlier
adoption date would not conflict with this objective.270
These cases may not all mention the presumption
against preemption by name, but their eventual outcomes
adhere to the basic concepts that underlie the presumption.
The cases show a proper, limited interpretation of the Geier
precedent.271 This interpretation preserves the federal desire to
regulate uniformly while still allowing the states to compensate
their victims.272 By asserting that minimum federal standards
alone do not preempt state actions, cases like Choate and
Harris have properly circumscribed the power of federal
agencies to preempt state common law actions.273 At the same
time, by recognizing that agencies can still preempt state laws
when its objective is to offer a choice, or both a minimum and
maximum, cases like Griffith and others have permitted
agencies to promulgate and administer regulations in a
uniform manner.274
C.

Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine

In 2002, just two years after Geier was decided, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, Sprietsma v.
Mercury Marine.275 The Court’s unanimous holding in
Sprietsma276 showed how the interpretation of the express
preemption and implied preemption clauses established in
Geier is both appropriate and flexible when interpreted
correctly.

270

Id.
Robert M. N. Palmer, The Auto-Safety Preemption War Since Geier, TRIAL,
Nov. 2001, at 48, 50-51 (citing Harris v. Great Dane, Griffith v. Gen. Motors Corp, and
Rogers v. Cosco as all correctly interpreting Geier as standing for preemption in a
limited set of circumstances).
272
See Bough & Johnson, supra note 56, at 34 (declaring that Geier stands as
an example of a limited application of the implied preemption doctrine). The major
victory in Geier, from a state and victims rights standpoint, was that the majority
rejected Honda’s argument of express preemption. Id. At the same time the holding
also still allowed the federal government to mandate options and phase-in programs.
Id.
273
See Palmer, supra note 274, at 50.
274
See Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American
Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 930 (1996) (arguing that the vast differences that have
developed between the states in the area of product liability means that it is time the
federal government step in and apply more uniform “mature and experienced decision
making”).
275
534 U.S. 1112 (2002), cert. granted.
276
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
271
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Mrs. Jeanne Sprietsma died in 1995 when she fell off a
small ski boat and was struck by the outboard motor’s
propeller, which had been manufactured by Mercury Marine
(Mercury).277 Mrs. Sprietsma’s husband filed a product liability
tort claim alleging that the motor had been defectively
designed because it lacked a propeller guard.278 Mercury
responded to the charges by claiming that the Federal Boat
Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) preempted Sprietsma’s claims.279
Before Geier had been decided, the Illinois trial court and the
Illinois intermediate appellate court had agreed with Mercury’s
interpretation of the FBSA’s express preemption clause and
dismissed Sprietsma’s claim.280 However, after Geier was
decided, the Illinois Supreme Court, interpreting Geier,
overturned the appellate court and declared that Sprietsma’s
claims were implicitly preempted.281 The Supreme Court
subsequently granted certiorari.282
Justice Stevens, the author of the dissent in Geier,
delivered the unanimous opinion in Sprietsma.283 According to
him, three issues had to be resolved. The first issue was
whether the FBSA expressly preempted common law tort
claims.284 The second issue was whether the Coast Guard’s
decision not to regulate propeller guards implicitly preempted
the common law claims.285 The last issue was whether the
potential conflict between state and federal regulation of
propeller guards would be significant enough to overcome the
presumption against preemption.286
Similar to Geier, Justice Stevens began his analysis in
Sprietsma by looking at the language of the FBSA, its history,
and that of the regulation in question. In relevant part, the
277

Id. at 54.
Id. at 55. A propeller guard is one of a set of “propeller injury avoidance
devices.” The purpose of these devices is to reduce the risk that boat propellers pose to
individuals in the water. There are at least four different types of propeller guards,
most of which are designed to deflect large objects away from the spinning propellers.
See United States Coast Guard, Boating Articles: Propeller Injury Risk Reduction,
available at http://www.uscgboating.org/articles/boatingview.aspx?id=67 (describing
the various types of propeller guards and listing each type’s advantages and
disadvantages) (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
279
46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2000) [hereinafter FBSA].
280
Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 55.
281
Id.
282
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 534 U.S. 1112 (2002).
283
Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 53.
284
Id. at 56.
285
Id.
286
Id.
278
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FBSA created an advisory council which provided
recommendations to the Coast Guard on all proposed
regulations under the act.287 The council was charged with
considering several factors, such as the “extent to which [a]
proposed regulation will contribute to boating safety” 288 and
whether the proposed regulation will “compel substantial
alteration of recreational vessel[s] . . . .”289 The process that led
to the Coast Guard’s ultimate decision not to issue a
requirement for propeller guards began in 1988. At that time,
due to the perceived high number of individuals injured in
propeller-related accidents, the Coast Guard initiated an
inquiry into whether it should require the installation of
guards.290 After a long study of the propeller guard issue, a
subcommittee of the advisory council recommended that the
Coast Guard “‘take no regulatory action to require propeller
guards.’”291 The Coast Guard followed this recommendation.292
After examining this history, Justice Stevens next
looked at the FBSA’s preemptive power. He began by
examining the act’s construction.293 Like the Safety Act in Geier,
the FBSA had both an express preemption clause and a saving
clause.294 He declared that the phrasing of the preemption
clause indicated that it was not intended to preempt common
law actions.295 Justice Stevens stated further that, in accordance
with Geier, the determination not to preempt common law
actions was “buttresse[d]” by the FBSA’s saving clause.296 As a

287

Id. at 58.
Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 58.
Id. at 58 n.7.
290
Id. at 60. In the opinion Justice Stevens noted that there were conflicting
figures given for the number of persons injured by propeller accidents each year. The
number ranging from around 100 accidents per year to more than 2,000. Id. at 60 n.8.
291
Id. at 61 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 43).
292
Id. at 61-62. In 2001 the advisory council recommended changes to this
policy as it pertains to “planing vessels 12 feet to 26 feet in length.” However as of the
time of the opinion the Coast Guard had not acted on this recommendation. Id. at 62
(quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 63645, 63647).
293
Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 56.
294
Id. at 58-59.
295
Id. at 62-63. This declaration that the express preemption clause would not
have preempted common law actions is different than the interpretation Justice Breyer
had of the Safety Act’s express preemption clause. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co.,
529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000) (stating that without the saving clause the express
preemption clause would have preempted all common law actions). This discrepancy
arises from the different terms used in each preemption clause. The FBSA refers to
preempting “law[s] or regulation[s],” Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 63, whereas the Safety Act
referred to preempting “safety standard[s].” Geier, 529 U.S. at 868.
296
Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 63.
288

289
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result, Justice Stevens wrote that the FBSA does not expressly
preempt state common law actions.297
Justice Stevens then proceeded to examine whether
Sprietsma’s action was implicitly preempted. He stated that
“[i]t is quite wrong to view [the Coast Guard’s] decision [not to
require propeller guards] as the functional equivalent of a
regulation prohibiting all States . . . from adopting such a
regulation.”298 An examination of the history of the act suggests
that when the Coast Guard chose not to regulate in an area
they presumed that the state could still do so.299 In addition, the
Coast Guard cited as a major reason for rejecting the propeller
guard regulation, the fact that not enough data was available
to justify what would be a technically difficult and expensive
regulation to impose.300 This was not an indication that the
Coast Guard believed it was a bad idea to have propeller
guards, but rather, under the current agency regulatory
scheme there was not sufficient evidence to indicate that a
national mandate was required.301
Justice Stevens wrote that the Coast Guard’s decision in
Sprietsma stood in “sharp contrast to the decision . . . given
pre-emptive effect in Geier . . . .”302 In Sprietsma, the Coast
Guard had written an amicus curiae brief, informing the
Justices that the agency did not view the decision as having
any preemptive effect.303 The Coast Guard’s position on the
FBSA’s preemptive effect was thus opposite the DOT’s position
on the preemptive effect of FMVSS 208.304 Justice Stevens
therefore held that, in accordance with Geier, there would be no
conflict between the Coast Guard’s intent in not regulating
propeller guards and Sprietsma’s common law state action,
which might mandate such a device.305
297

Id. at 63-65 (using Geier’s assertion that “an express preemption clause
‘does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption principles.’”).
298
Id. at 65.
299
Id. at 65-66. Shortly after the FBSA took effect the Secretary of
Transportation issued a statement that all then-existing state laws were exempt from
being preempted by the FBSA. Id. at 59. Every time that the Coast Guard has issued
new regulations since they have limited the scope of this blanket exemption to those
“[s]tate statutes and regulations” that are not otherwise covered by a federal
regulation. Id. (citing 38 Fed. Reg. 6914-6915).
300
Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 66.
301
Id. at 66-67. (stating that the decision was made within the “FBSA’s
‘stringent’ criteria for federal regulation”).
302
Id. at 67.
303
Id. at 68.
304
See discussion supra Part III.B.
305
Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 68.
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The Court’s holding in Sprietsma confirms the
suggestion that the Geier decision is a somewhat limited
decision which represents a balancing of federal and state
needs, and an approach that other courts should use in
evaluating the preemptive effects of laws containing both an
express preemption clause and a saving clause.306 Sprietsma
highlights how implied preemption, combined with the implicit
use of the presumption against preemption, will allow courts to
balance the needs of both the federal government in
uniformity, and the states in protecting their citizens.307 Finally,
the decision also demonstrates how the Court has chosen to
defer to the opinion of various agencies regarding the
preemptive effects of their regulations.308 In the end, Sprietsma
is a strong indication that Geier allows, but does not require, a
finding of implied preemption.309
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s decision in Geier was an
important but limited holding. While Geier is most likely to be
remembered for its interpretation of the express preemption
and saving clauses, the precedent Geier established has not
greatly changed the balance between federal and state
regulations. The decision did not eradicate the presumption
against preemption, nor did it create a situation where the
federal regulation will more frequently preempt the state. The

306

See id. at 63-64 (referencing Geier in discussing how the FBSA’s saving
clause supports the Court’s reading of the express preemption clause to not include
common law actions).
307
See id. at 65-66 (holding that, in light of the FBSA’s stringent criteria for
federal regulation, the Coast Guard’s decision to not regulate propeller guards should
not be viewed as the equivalent of a decision to not allow propeller guards). This
conclusion was fully consistent with the FBSA’s history of preserving state regulatory
authority in areas where the federal government had not yet regulated. Id. at 65.
308
See id. at 68 (declaring that because the Court’s reasoning in Sprietsma
centrally revolved around the opinion of the Coast Guard, that the holding was
strongly supported by its reasoning in Geier).
309
See discussion supra Part V.
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Supreme Court’s decision that FSVMM 208 preempted state
action represents one point on the preemption spectrum, a
spectrum that is beginning to be filled in by the lower courts.
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